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INCENTIVIZING CORPORATE AMERICA TO ERADICATE
TRANSNATIONAL BRIBERY WORLDWIDE: FEDERAL
TRANSPARENCY AND VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE UNDER
THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
Peter R. Reilly
Abstract
In 1977, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
discovered that hundreds of U.S. companies had spent hundreds of
millions of dollars in bribes to improve business overseas. In response,
Congress passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), thereby
making it illegal to bribe foreign officials to obtain a business
advantage. A major tension has emerged between the federal agencies
charged with enforcing the FCPA (i.e., the U.S. Department of Justice
(DOJ) and the SEC), and the corporate entities trying to stay within the
legal and regulatory bounds of the statute. Specifically, while the
government appears to be trying to maximize discretion and flexibility
in carrying out its enforcement duties, companies are calling for more
transparency and guidance. Unfortunately, the government’s FCPA
Resource Guide, published in 2012 to provide the public with more
direction, fails to shed enough light on how to successfully conform to
this complicated statute.
This Article focuses on the difficult and strategic decision of whether
a company should self-report to the government a potential FCPA
violation. After reviewing the advantages and disadvantages of selfreporting, this Article argues that the government needs to be more
transparent and forthcoming regarding the potential benefits of doing
so; it argues that the government must provide greater transparency
regarding specific and calculable benefits that can be achieved through
self-reporting and cooperation in the face of possible FCPA violations.
Finally, this Article concludes that companies will be more likely to
self-report such violations—and thereby assist in eradicating the
scourge of transnational bribery worldwide—only if there is more
certainty that the benefits achieved from self-reporting will outweigh
the risks and costs involved.
* Associate Professor of Law, Texas A&M School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School;
LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center; Hewlett Fellow in Conflict Resolution,
Georgetown University Law Center (2002–2005). I am grateful for the comments I received
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Koehler, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Tim Mulvaney, Lisa Rich, Matthew Runkel, and Neil Sobol. I
also wish to thank Patrick Flanagan and the librarians at Texas A&M School of Law for their
helpful assistance during this project. Of course, all errors are my own.
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INTRODUCTION
For nearly four decades, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)1
has worked to help eradicate the bribing2 of foreign officials to obtain
business advantages. When is it strategically wise for companies to selfreport violations of the FCPA to the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)
or the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)? Top DOJ
officials state that voluntary disclosure is an important factor in
deciding whether and how to prosecute a company, and the agency “has
and will continue to provide meaningful credit”3 for companies that
self-report.4 The director of the SEC’s Enforcement Division answers
the question even more forcefully: “[A]ny company that does the
calculus will realize that self-reporting [FCPA misconduct] is always in
the company’s best interest.”5
1. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78q(b)(2)–(3), 78dd-1 to -3
(2012) (amended 1988 and 1998).
2. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 186 (7th ed. 1999) (defining bribery as “[t]he corrupt
payment, receipt, or solicitation of a private favor for official action”).
3. Mike Koehler, World Bribery & Corruption Compliance Forum—Comments by U.S.
Officials, FCPA PROFESSOR (Sept. 16, 2010), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/world-briberycorruption-compliance-forum-comments-by-u-s-officials [hereinafter Koehler, World Bribery]
(quoting Charles Duross, then-Deputy Chief of the DOJ’s Criminal–Fraud Section); see also
Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney General, Speech at the American Conference Institute’s
31st International Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 19, 2014), available
at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-leslie-r-caldwell-speaksamerican-conference-institute-s-31st (“[W]e still encourage and reward self-disclosure and
cooperation.”); Alice S. Fisher, Assistant Attorney General, Prepared Remarks at the American
Bar Association National Institute on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Oct. 16, 2006),
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/pr/speech/2006/10-16-06AAGFCPASpeech
.pdf (“[I]f you are doing the things you should be doing—whether it is self-policing, selfreporting, conducting proactive risk assessments, improving your controls and procedures,
training on the FCPA, or cooperating with an investigation after it starts—you will get a
benefit.”).
4. Rachel Louise Ensign, Why Companies Might Opt to Self-Report Potential Bribery
Issues, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 2, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/why-companies-might-opt-toself-report-potential-bribery-issues-1414974824 (quoting James Koukios, Senior Deputy Chief
of the DOJ’s Criminal–Fraud Section).
5. Andrew Ceresney, Director, Enforcement Division, SEC, Remarks at 31st
International Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 19, 2014) [hereinafter
Ceresney, Conference Remarks] (emphasis added), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/
Speech/Detail/Speech/1370543493598#.VLyNb7lOWM8; see also Andrew Ceresney, Keynote
Address at the International Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 19, 2103),
available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370540392284#.UrUvXJqA2M8
(“Some lawyers sometimes ask me what is the incentive to notify us promptly about
wrongdoing that you uncover? The answer is simple—if we find the violations on our own, the
consequences will surely be worse than if you had self-reported the conduct . . . . We have a
wide range of tools available to us to facilitate and reward meaningful cooperation—from
reduced charges and penalties, to taking no action at all.”).
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However, academics, attorneys, and consultants who research,
practice, and advise in the area of the FCPA suggest that the answer to
this pivotal question is a bit more nuanced and complicated. As a
partner in a leading national law firm puts it: “Voluntary disclosure is a
business decision . . . . What are the costs and benefits? Right now it’s a
guessing game.”6 Despite exhortations from the federal government for
businesses to self-report FCPA violations and obtain the attendant
benefits, this Article suggests that there are times when it might not be a
good idea, from a business perspective, for corporate entities to do so.
In other words, this Article suggests that under current DOJ and SEC
policy, a company’s ability and willingness to self-report is not always
strategically wise in the context of FCPA enforcement. This Article
explores, through the lens of a number of significant FCPA cases, the
many factors companies must consider when making this difficult
decision. This Article also investigates the policies and programs used
by the federal government to persuade corporate entities to self-report
and cooperate, including the kinds of results that might be achieved
from doing so. This Article demonstrates that although the risks
associated with voluntary disclosure tend to be concrete and predictable,
the rewards have been largely uncertain—a calculus that oftentimes
militates against disclosure.
This Article is divided into five Parts: Part I discusses the extent of
the transnational bribery problem and provides a brief history of the
FCPA. Part II discusses how corporate entities can cooperate with the
DOJ and SEC in the context of a potential FCPA violation, including
how the DOJ’s Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations (Principles of Prosecution) and the SEC’s so-called
“Seaboard Report” and “Penalties Statement” play a role in evaluating
cooperation. Part II also discusses how the DOJ and SEC might use
various tools, such as deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) and nonprosecution agreements (NPAs), to reward the cooperating entities. This
Part underscores the enormous amount of discretion both agencies have
in deciding whether, and to what degree, they will bestow benefits upon
corporate entities for self-reporting and other cooperative behavior.
Part III discusses Chapter Eight of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
(Sentencing Guidelines), which governs the sentencing of organizations
and provides incentives for the voluntary disclosure of potential FCPA
violations. To provide a sense of how various factors influence the final
outcome of FCPA cases, this Part reviews the plea agreements and
DPAs of seven well-known FCPA matters. All seven cases involve
6. Ensign, supra note 4 (emphasis added) (quoting Laurence Urgenson, Partner at Mayer
Brown LLP).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss5/4

4

Reilly and Reilly: Incentivizing Corporate America to Eradicate Transnational Briber

2015]

INCENTIVIZING CORPORATE AMERICA TO ERADICATE TRANSNATIONAL BRIBERY

1687

some of the largest FCPA fines paid in U.S. history.7 In three of the
cases, the defendant elected to self-report the matter to the federal
government, and in four of the cases, the defendant failed to self-report.
This Part concludes, based on the seven cases reviewed and additional
scholarship in the area, that (1) voluntary disclosure does not appear to
correlate with reduced monetary penalties in FCPA matters, and (2) the
ultimate outcome of a government FCPA investigation appears to
depend more on the seriousness of a company’s transgression than on
whether the company self-reported that transgression to the government.
Part IV reviews the Ralph Lauren Corporation FCPA matter, a
widely reported case in the legal press that stands for the proposition
that self-reporting is strategically the best course of action for a
company due to the potential benefits. This Part challenges that
proposition and, furthermore, questions the fairness of using DPAs and
NPAs as vehicles for disposing of FCPA matters instead of following
the more traditional routes of plea bargains or trials.8 Part V attempts to
develop an FCPA self-reporting calculus by setting forth both the
advantages and disadvantages of self-reporting.
Finally, this Article links together observations from Parts I through
V and concludes that (1) it could sometimes be reasonable for a
corporate entity, when faced with the discovery of an FCPA violation,
to decide not to voluntarily disclose the wrongdoing; and (2) to increase
the likelihood that companies will consistently self-report FCPA
violations, and thereby assist in eradicating the scourge of transnational
bribery worldwide, the DOJ and SEC must be far more transparent.
Their policies, pronouncements, rules, and regulations must provide
more certain, specific, and calculable incentives to companies for
volunteering to come forward.

7. See Richard L. Cassin, With Alstom, Three French Companies Are Now in the FCPA
Top Ten, FCPA BLOG (Dec. 23, 2014, 9:45 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2014/12/23/
with-alstom-three-french-companies-are-now-in-the-fcpa-top-t.html#.
8. In a plea bargain, defendants negotiate for a lesser charge, penalty, or sentence, but in
general they ultimately accept both guilt and conviction. See Benjamin M. Greenblum, Note,
What Happens to a Prosecution Deferred? Judicial Oversight of Corporate Deferred
Prosecution Agreements, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1863, 1869 (2005) (“A guilty plea [in a plea
bargain] results in a conviction and collateral consequences attach no differently than if the
offender had been convicted in a trial.”). Of course, an Alford plea would involve a no-contest
plea where the defendant accepts a conviction but does not admit guilt. See Stephanos Bibas,
Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford
and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 1362, 1372 (2003).
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I. THE TRANSNATIONAL BRIBERY PROBLEM AND THE FCPA
Corporations have engaged in transnational bribery for almost four
hundred years. This Part discusses the pervasiveness of the practice and
provides a brief history of the FCPA, which represents Congress’s
attempt to combat the problem of corporate transnational bribery.
A. Extent of the Bribery Problem
The first reported case of corporate foreign bribery occurred in the
seventeenth century, when the British East India Company bribed
Mogul rulers with rare and exotic treasures in return for a tax break on
exports.9 Today, the World Bank Institute estimates that the total
amount of bribes paid per year worldwide is approximately $1 trillion.10
Alexandra Wrage, President of TRACE International, a nonprofit
business association whose mission is to raise international standards of
anti-bribery compliance, states that bribery is not only “wrong” but also
“uneconomical, inefficient, costly, distorting of proper incentives and
outcomes, risky, and generally unprofitable.”11 A leading FCPA scholar
concludes that “[b]ribery blights lives, undermines democracy, and
distorts markets.”12 Other scholars have demonstrated its dramatically
negative impact on economies throughout the world, including the
“power to reduce private foreign investment into countries that host
bribery, lower a host country’s tax base, and positively correlate with
reduced economic development.”13 In short, bribery “harms
governments, commercial entities, global markets, and the public at
large.”14
Nevertheless, bribery and corruption appear to be both relentless and
pervasive. Ernst & Young’s 13th Global Fraud Survey, which included
2719 interviews of senior decision makers in a sample of the largest
companies throughout fifty-nine countries and territories, found that a
majority of respondents in 40% of those countries felt there was
9. Milton S. Gwirtzman, Is Bribery Defensible?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 5, 1975, at 19.
10. Six Questions on the Cost of Corruption with World Bank Institute Global
Governance Director Daniel Kaufmann, WORLD BANK, http://go.worldbank.org/KQH743GKF1
(last visited July 22, 2015).
11. ALEXANDRA ADDISON WRAGE, BRIBERY AND EXTORTION: UNDERMINING BUSINESS,
GOVERNMENTS, AND SECURITY 124 (2007).
12. Joseph W. Yockey, Solicitation, Extortion, and the FCPA, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
781, 783 (2011).
13. Jeffrey R. Boles, The Two Faces of Bribery: International Corruption Pathways Meet
Conflicting Legislative Regimes, 35 MICH. J. INT’L L. 673, 679–80 (2014).
14. Id. at 680. For an overview of the harms that flow from transnational bribery, see
Philip M. Nichols, Regulating Transnational Bribery in Times of Globalization and
Fragmentation, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 257, 274–79 (1999).
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widespread corruption.15 In Egypt, Kenya, and Nigeria, 80% of the
respondents
perceived
widespread
corruption.16
Moreover,
Transparency International’s 2014 Progress Report on global
enforcement of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development’s (OECD) Anti-Bribery Convention concludes that global
trade is a long way from being corruption-free.17 The report declares
specifically that “the performance of the majority of the 40 countries
that agree to combat foreign bribery in international business
transactions is far from satisfactory.”18
Interestingly, the report found that in a majority of cases, high-level
management is involved in the bribery. In 41% of cases, corporate
managers sanctioned the wrongdoing, and in an additional 12% of
cases, the CEO permitted the bribes.19 Additionally, two other
researchers sum up the pervasiveness of foreign bribery: “[Corruption]
stretches from multinational firms in the United States, to manufacturers
in China, to farmers in Latin America. It has led to water scarcity in
Spain, child labor in China, illegal logging in Indonesia, unsafe
medicine in Nigeria and poorly constructed buildings in Turkey, where
collapses have killed people.”20
15. ERNST & YOUNG, 13TH GLOBAL FRAUD SURVEY 12, 22 (2014), available at
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-13th-Global-Fraud-Survey/$FILE/EY-13thGlobal-Fraud-Survey.pdf.
16. Id. at 12.
17. Fritz Heimann et al., Exporting Corruption: Progress Report 2014: Assessing
Enforcement of the OECD Convention on Combating Foreign Bribery, TRANSPARENCY INT’L 2
(2014), available at http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/exporting_corruption
_progress_report_2014_assessing_enforcement_of_the_oecd. Note that forty-one nations have
signed the 1997 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: thirty-four OECD member countries and
seven non-member countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, Latvia, Russia,
and South Africa. Press Release, OECD, Latvia to Join OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (July 4,
2014),
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/latvia-to-join-oecd-anti-briberyconvention.htm; see also Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development,
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions (1997), S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-43, reprinted in 37 I.L.M 1 (1998), available at
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf.
18. Heimann et al., supra note 17, at 4. Only four of the forty countries that subscribe to
the Anti-Bribery Convention engage in active enforcement: Germany, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. Id. at 4. Twenty-two countries have little enforcement or no
enforcement whatsoever, including Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Columbia, the Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, the
Netherlands, Poland, Russia, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, and Turkey.
Id. at 4–5.
19. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD FOREIGN BRIBERY REPORT: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE CRIME OF BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS 22 (2014).
20. Francis X. Donnelly & Sarah Kellogg, Understanding Corruption, GEO. WASH. BUS.,
Fall 2011, at 9.
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SEC Chairperson Mary Jo White stated that FCPA enforcement is
“among the most prominent concerns” facing the agency in the
international arena.21 She also acknowledged that transgression of the
statute “not only undermines international markets and governments but
also simultaneously undermines the reporting and disclosure integrity of
our own markets.”22 This helps explain why the SEC, DOJ, and the U.S.
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have collaborated in conducting a
foreign bribery training program for 130 investigators and prosecutors
from thirty different countries around the world.23 It also helps explain
why the FBI recently created three squads to specifically target FCPA
violations originating abroad and reaching the United States.24 The FBI
will assign approximately thirty agents to the squads in Los Angeles,
New York, and Washington, D.C.25 Jeffrey Sallet, the FBI’s Public
Corruption Chief, stated in an interview: “Corruption leads to lack of
confidence in government. Lack of confidence in government leads to
failed states. Failed states lead to terror and national security issues.”26
B. Brief History of the FCPA
In 1977, the SEC discovered that hundreds of U.S. companies had
invested hundreds of millions of dollars in foreign bribery to improve
business overseas.27 Recognizing that such corruption “imposes
enormous costs both at home and abroad, leading to market
inefficiencies and instability, sub-standard products, and an unfair
playing field for honest business,” Congress passed the FCPA.28 The
law criminalizes bribing foreign officials to obtain a business advantage
and also requires companies registered with the SEC to keep accurate
books and records.29 Thus, two sets of provisions make up the statute:
21. Mary Jo White, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Chairperson, Speech to the
Investment Company Institute: Regulation in a Global Financial System (May 1, 2013).
22. Id.; Donnelly & Kellogg, supra note 20, at 9.
23. White, supra note 21.
24. Eric Tucker, New FBI Squads Put Foreign Crime in Crosshairs, HOUS. CHRON., Jan.
14, 2015, http://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/economy/article/New-FBI-squads-putforeign-crime-in-crosshairs-6016628.php.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIM. DIV. & SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT DIV.,
DOJ-12-1354, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 3 (2012),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2015/01/16/guide.pdf
[hereinafter FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE].
28. Id.; see also Andrew Brady Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions: Understanding AntiBribery Legislation as Economic Sanctions Against Emerging Markets, 62 FLA. L. REV. 351,
360 (2010) (describing Lockheed Martin’s earlier foreign bribery controversy).
29. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3, § 78m (2012).
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the anti-bribery provisions,30 and the books and records and internal
control provisions.31 The anti-bribery provisions make it illegal for
companies to bribe foreign officials to obtain or retain business,
therefore making it a crime to give money, gifts, promises, or “anything
of value” to any foreign official for the purpose of
(i) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in
his official capacity, (ii) inducing such foreign official to do
or omit to do any act in violation of the lawful duty of such
official, or (iii) securing any improper advantage; or (B)
inducing such foreign official to use his influence with a
foreign government or instrumentality thereof to affect or
influence any act or decision of such government or
instrumentality, in order to assist such person in obtaining
or retaining business for or with, or directing business to,
any person . . . .32
The books and records and internal control provisions require
companies registered with the SEC to maintain accurate books and
records and to implement an effective system of internal accounting
controls.33 The DOJ and SEC together enforce the statute,34 generally
with the DOJ enforcing the bribery provisions and the SEC enforcing
the accounting provisions.35 In 1988, Congress amended the FCPA to
allow for affirmative defenses,36 and in 1998, Congress further
expanded the law’s territorial jurisdiction and authority.37

30. See id. §§ 78dd-1 to -3.
31. See id. § 78m(b).
32. Id. §§ 78dd-1 to -3. Note that the brief excerpt appearing in the text attempts to
capture the essence of a far more detailed and intricate statute.
33. Mike Koehler, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT IN A NEW ERA 136–37 (2014).
34. Stuart H. Deming, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL NORMS 75 (2d ed. 2010).
35. Lillian V. Blageff, 1 FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT REPORTER § 1:1 (2d ed.); see
also Cortney C. Thomas, Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Decade of Rapid
Expansion Explained, Defended, and Justified, 29 REV. LITIG. 439, 444 n.27 (2010) (discussing
the history of the FCPA).
36. Mike Koehler, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT IN A NEW ERA 120–21 (2014).
Koehler discusses both affirmative defenses: The first is for payments that are considered to be
acceptable pursuant to the laws and regulations within a given foreign nation; the second is for
reasonable and legitimate payments related to particular products, services, or contracts.
37. FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 2727, at 4 (noting that Congress amended the
FCPA to comport with the newly-created Anti-Bribery Convention, of which the United States
was a founding party). The “amendments expanded the FCPA’s scope to: (1) include payments
made to secure ‘any improper advantage’; (2) reach certain foreign persons who commit an act
in furtherance of a foreign bribe while in the United States; (3) cover public international
organizations in the definition of ‘foreign official’; (4) add an alternative basis for jurisdiction
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During the first two decades after its passage, enforcement of the
FCPA was somewhat limited: Between 1977 and 1997, prosecutors
only charged seventeen companies and thirty-three individuals under
the Act.38 Starting in the early 2000s, however, enforcement of the
FCPA began to surge. From 2007 through 2014, there were 309
enforcement actions by the SEC and DOJ combined.39 In that same time
period, the average total value of monetary resolutions in corporate
FCPA enforcement actions increased dramatically from $7.3 million in
2007 to $156.6 million in 2014.40 Indeed, the Alstom S.A. case settled in
December 2014 for a total resolution of $772.3 million—just short of
the record-holding $800 million resolution of the Siemens AG matter in
2008.41
II. COOPERATION WITH UNCLE SAM: NEGOTIATIONS, CARROTS, AND
STICKS
In his seminal article, Corporate Prosecution, Cooperation, and the
Trading of Favors, Professor William S. Laufer suggests that law
enforcement within the corporate context oftentimes translates into “a
brand of negotiated compliance” involving “reciprocal promises,”
where companies cooperate and accept responsibility “in exchange for
mitigation, exculpation, or absolution.”42 Professor Laufer uses
language of negotiation theory as he refers to this “bargained-for
exchange or trading of favors, with an arsenal of sanctions in the
background.”43 Professor Laufer states:
With the threat of significant . . . fines, corporations have
little choice but to trade favors with authorities. The
importance of and need for these reciprocal promises is
rarely challenged. Given extremely limited resources, the
complex nature of the corporate form, and the
accompanying evidentiary challenges facing prosecutors, it
is little wonder that the government often exchanges
based on nationality; and (5) apply criminal penalties to foreign nationals employed by or acting
as agents of U.S. companies.” Id.
38. Tor Krever, Curbing Corruption? The Efficacy of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
33 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 83, 94 (2007).
39. See GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, 2014 YEAR-END FCPA UPDATE 2 (2015),
available
at
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2014-Year-End-FCPAUpdate.pdf.
40. See id. at 3.
41. Id. at 4.
42. William S. Laufer, Corporate Prosecution, Cooperation, and the Trading of Favors,
87 IOWA L. REV. 643, 645–47 (2002).
43. Id. at 646.
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leniency for conciliatory post-offense behavior.44
Other scholars have described the interaction between prosecutors
and corporate defendants not as a negotiation involving a “bargained-for
exchange,” but rather as the unfolding of a “carrot and stick” situation.
As an article published by The Economist stated in 1946: “The human
donkey requires either a carrot in front or a stick behind to goad it into
activity. . . .”45 Indeed, implicit in the organizational sentencing
guidelines of the U.S. Sentencing Commission (Sentencing
Commission) is a “carrot and stick” structure. Winthrop M. Swenson,
formerly the Sentencing Commission’s Deputy General Counsel,
described first the “stick” and then the “carrot” at a Sentencing
Commission conference on corporate crime in America:
[C]ompanies that (1) fail to take certain actions (e.g.,
establish strong compliance programs, voluntarily disclose
misconduct, fully cooperate in the investigation of the
misconduct) and (2) have attributes indicating greater
institutional culpability for misconduct (e.g., had senior
corporate officials involved in the offense, or had
employees obstruct justice) face stiff penalties in the event
of a violation. Companies that take the prescribed steps,
and do not evince attributes of greater institutional
culpability, will avoid onerous penalties should a violation
happen to occur.46
One scholar argues, however, that the Sentencing Commission’s
approach may have exhibited more stick than carrot, stating: “If a
company adopted a compliance program and self-reported violations, it
received no guarantee of leniency. On the other hand, the failure to
pursue the carrot ‘voluntarily’ virtually guaranteed being hit with the
stick in the event of a corporate conviction.”47 To what extent, then,
does the current cooperation dynamic between prosecutors and
defendant corporations represent a “negotiation” or “trading of favors,”
and to what extent does it represent more of a “carrot and stick”
situation, where the “carrot in front” or the “stick behind” effectively
44. Id.
45. The Carrot and the Stick, THE ECONOMIST, June 29, 1946, reprinted in 8 AM. AFF.
282, 282 (1946).
46. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, CORPORATE CRIME IN AMERICA: STRENGTHENING THE
“GOOD CITIZEN” CORPORATION at 24 (1995) (emphasis added), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/organizational-guidelines/special-reports/
wcsympo.pdf.
47. John S. Baker, Jr., Reforming Corporations Through Threats of Federal Prosecution,
89 CORNELL L. REV. 310, 317 (2004) (footnote omitted).
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prods companies into self-reporting and exhibiting other cooperating
behaviors toward the government? Or does the interplay between
prosecutors and defendant companies effectively encompass elements
of all three—negotiations, carrots, and sticks? A closer look at the
policies and regulations surrounding corporate cooperation with the
DOJ and SEC can begin to shed light on these questions.
A. Cooperating with the DOJ
The Filip Memo,48 officially entitled “Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations” (Principles of Prosecution), was
codified49 in the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual on August 28, 2008.50 The
Principles of Prosecution instruct federal prosecutors to consider the
following nine factors when determining whether or not to charge a
corporation or business entity:
(1) [T]he nature and seriousness of the offense, including
the risk of harm to the public, and applicable policies
and priorities, if any, governing the prosecution of
corporations for particular categories of crime;
(2) [T]he pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the
corporation, including the complicity in, or the
condoning of, the wrongdoing by corporate
management;
(3) [T]he corporation’s history of similar conduct,
including prior criminal, civil, and regulatory
enforcement actions against it;
(4) [T]he corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of
wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the
investigation of its agents;
(5) [T]he existence and effectiveness of the corporation’s
pre-existing compliance program;
(6) [T]he corporation’s remedial actions, including any
efforts to implement an effective corporate compliance
48. Memorandum from Mark Filip, Deputy Attorney Gen., to Heads of Department
Components and U.S. Attorneys (Aug. 28, 2008) [hereinafter Filip Memo], available at
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2008/11/03/dag-memo-08282008.pdf.
49. Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney Gen., Remarks at New York University Law
School’s Program on Corporate Compliance and Enforcement (Apr. 17, 2015).
50. See Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organization, in U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL 9-28.000 (2008) [hereinafter UNITED STATES
ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL], available at http://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-28000-principlesfederal-prosecution-business-organizations.
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program or to improve an existing one, to replace
responsible management, to discipline or terminate
wrongdoers, to pay restitution, and to cooperate with
the relevant government agencies;
(7) [C]ollateral consequences, including whether there is
disproportionate harm to shareholders, pension
holders, employees, and others not proven personally
culpable, as well as the impact on the public arising
from the prosecution;
(8) [T]he adequacy of the prosecution of individuals
responsible for the corporation’s malfeasance; and
(9) [T]he adequacy of remedies such as civil or regulatory
enforcement actions.51
The fourth and sixth factors involve voluntary disclosure and
cooperation with the government.52 It is important to note, however, that
the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual makes it clear that the Principles of
Prosecution do not create specific legal rights for the parties involved,
stating: “The Manual provides only internal Department of Justice
guidance. It is not intended to, does not, and may not be relied upon to
create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any
party in any matter civil or criminal.”53
Moreover, the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual makes it clear that, despite
the nine factors set forth in the Principles of Prosecution, prosecutors
retain significant charging discretion regarding violations of federal
criminal law.54 Indeed, the last sentence of the Filip Memo
reemphasizes the wide discretion given to prosecutors in carrying out
their charging duties, stating: “Nor are any limitations hereby placed on
otherwise lawful litigative prerogatives of the Department of Justice.”55
B. Cooperating with the SEC
The SEC issued its so-called Seaboard Report in October 2001.56
The Seaboard Report attempted to reveal how the agency decided what
51. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 50, at 9-28.300.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1-1.100 (emphasis added).
54. See Filip Memo, supra note 48, at 4 (“In making a decision to charge a corporation,
the prosecutor generally has substantial latitude in determining when, whom, how, and even
whether to prosecute for violations of federal criminal law.”).
55. Id. at 21.
56. Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement
Decisions, Exchange Act Release No. 34-44969, 76 SEC Docket 220 (Oct. 23, 2001)
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penalties to impose on companies that violated the federal securities
laws.57 The Seaboard Report recognized four measures of a company’s
cooperation:
Self-policing prior to the discovery of the misconduct,
including establishing effective compliance procedures and
an appropriate tone at the top;
Self-reporting of misconduct when it is discovered,
including conducting a thorough review of the nature,
extent, origins, and consequences of the misconduct, and
promptly, completely, and effectively disclosing the
misconduct to the public, to regulators, and to selfregulators;
Remediation, including dismissing or appropriately
disciplining wrongdoers, modifying, and improving
internal controls and procedures to prevent recurrence of
the misconduct, and appropriately compensating those
adversely affected; and
Cooperation with law enforcement authorities, including
providing the Commission staff with all information
relevant to the underlying violations and the company’s
remedial efforts.58
The Seaboard Report also sets forth various criteria the SEC considers
in determining whether (and to what extent) it will give a company
credit for self-reporting, self-policing, remediation, and cooperation—
“from the extraordinary step of taking no enforcement action to
bringing reduced charges, seeking lighter sanctions, or including
mitigating language in documents we use to announce and resolve
enforcement actions.”59 On January 4, 2006, the SEC issued a statement

[hereinafter Seaboard Report].
57. See id.
58. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Issues Report of Investigation and
Statement Setting Forth Framework for Evaluating Cooperation in Exercising Prosecutorial
Discretion (Oct. 23, 2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/headlines/prosdiscretion.htm.
59. Seaboard Report, supra note 56. The following questions assist in guiding the SEC
investigations:
1.
2.
3.
4.

What is the nature of the misconduct involved? . . .
How did the misconduct arise? . . .
Where in the organization did the misconduct occur? . . .
How long did the misconduct last? . . .
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to elaborate further on the role that cooperation plays in the agency’s
determination of whether to impose monetary penalties on
corporations.60 The statement, which has come to be known as the
“Penalties Statement,”61 announced that the two primary factors that the
SEC considers are “[t]he presence or absence of a direct benefit to the
corporation as a result of the violation”62 and “[t]he degree to which the
penalty will recompense or further harm the injured shareholders.”63
5. How much harm has the misconduct inflicted upon investors and other
corporate constituencies? Did the share price of the company's stock drop
significantly upon its discovery and disclosure?
6. How was the misconduct detected and who uncovered it?
7. How long after discovery of the misconduct did it take to implement an
effective response?
8. What steps did the company take upon learning of the misconduct? . . .
9. What processes did the company follow to resolve many of these issues
and ferret out necessary information? . . .
10. Did the company commit to learn the truth, fully and expeditiously? . . .
11. Did the company promptly make available to our staff the results of its
review and provide sufficient documentation reflecting its response to the
situation? . . .
12. What assurances are there that the conduct is unlikely to recur? . . .
13. Is the company the same company in which the misconduct occurred, or
has it changed through a merger or bankruptcy reorganization?
Id. (footnote omitted).
60. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement of the Securities and Exchange
Commission Concerning Financial Penalties (Jan. 4, 2006), available at
www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-4.htm.
61. See, e.g., Barry W. Rashkover & Laurin Blumenthal Kleiman, SEC Enforcement and
Examinations Concerning Hedge Funds, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 599, 632 (2008); Annette L.
Nazareth, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch.Comm’n, Remarks Before the American Bar Association
National Institute on Securities Fraud (Sept. 28, 2006), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/2006/spch092806aln.htm.
62. See id. (“The fact that a corporation itself has received a direct and material benefit
from the offense, for example through reduced expenses or increased revenues, weighs in
support of the imposition of a corporate penalty. If the corporation is in any other way unjustly
enriched, this similarly weighs in support of the imposition of a corporate penalty. Within this
parameter, the strongest case for the imposition of a corporate penalty is one in which the
shareholders of the corporation have received an improper benefit as a result of the violation;
the weakest case is one in which the current shareholders of the corporation are the principal
victims of the securities law violation.”).
63. See id. (“Because the protection of innocent investors is a principal objective of the
securities laws, the imposition of a penalty on the corporation itself carries with it the risk that
shareholders who are innocent of the violation will nonetheless bear the burden of the penalty.
In some cases, however, the penalty itself may be used as a source of funds to recompense the
injury suffered by victims of the securities law violations. The presence of an opportunity to use
the penalty as a meaningful source of compensation to injured shareholders is a factor in support
of its imposition. The likelihood a corporate penalty will unfairly injure investors, the
corporation, or third parties weighs against its use as a sanction.”).
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Other factors include the need for deterrence; any injury caused to third
parties; the difficulty in detecting the offense; and the company’s level
of intent, effort in taking remedial action, and cooperation with the
government and law enforcement.64
On January 13, 2010, Robert Khuzami, then-Director of the SEC’s
Division of Enforcement, announced new cooperation practices that
would be a “potential game-changer.”65 The new policies set forth a
framework for evaluating cooperation between individuals and the
SEC.66 The SEC also formally adopted the Seaboard Report as part of
its Enforcement Manual67 and provided the agency with important
cooperation tools, including proffer agreements,68 cooperation
agreements,69 DPAs,70 and NPAs.71 These new policies provided the
64. Id.
65. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Announces Initiative to Encourage
Individuals and Companies to Cooperate and Assist in Investigations (Jan. 13, 2010), available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-6.htm.
66. Specifically, the SEC staff would consider the following four broad factors: (1) “[t]he
assistance provided by the cooperating individual;” (2) “[t]he importance of the underlying
matter in which the individual cooperated;” (3) “[t]he societal interest in ensuring the individual
is held accountable for his or her misconduct;” and (4) “[t]he appropriateness of cooperation
credit based upon the risk profile of the cooperating individual.” Id.; SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
DIV. OF ENFORCEMENT, OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL, ENFORCEMENT MANUAL § 6.1.1 (Oct. 9,
2013) [hereinafter ENFORCEMENT MANUAL], available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/
enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf. Ultimately, the critical inquiry is “whether the public interest
in facilitating and rewarding an individual’s cooperation in order to advance the Commission’s
law enforcement interests justifies the credit awarded to the individual for his or her
cooperation.” Id.
67. ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 66, § 6.1.2.
68. Id. § 6.2.1 (“A proffer agreement is a written agreement providing that any statements
made by a person, on a specific date, may not be used against that individual in subsequent
proceedings, except that the Commission may use statements made during the proffer session as
a source of leads to discover additional evidence and for impeachment or rebuttal purposes if the
person testifies or argues inconsistently in a subsequent proceeding.”).
69. Id. § 6.2.2 (“A cooperation agreement is a written agreement between the Division of
Enforcement and a potential cooperating individual or company prepared to provide substantial
assistance to the Commission’s investigation and related enforcement actions. Specifically, in a
cooperation agreement, the Division agrees to recommend to the Commission that the individual
or company receive credit for cooperating in its investigation and related enforcement actions
and, under certain circumstances, to make specific enforcement recommendations if, among
other things: 1) the Division concludes that the individual or company has provided or is likely
to provide substantial assistance to the Commission; 2) the individual or company agrees to
cooperate truthfully and fully in the Commission’s investigation and related enforcement actions
and waive the applicable statute of limitations; and 3) the individual or company satisfies
his/her/its obligations under the agreement. If the agreement is violated, the staff may
recommend an enforcement action to the Commission against the individual or company
without any limitation.”).
70. Id. § 6.2.3 (“A deferred prosecution agreement is a written agreement between the
Commission and a potential cooperating individual or company in which the Commission
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SEC with a tremendous amount of discretion, along with a substantial
array of options, in deciding whether, when, and how to recognize or
reward cooperative behavior while carrying out its FCPA enforcement
actions and proceedings. Indeed, the “Fostering Cooperation” section of
the SEC Enforcement Manual states explicitly that the agency will
analyze the “unique facts and circumstances”72 of a given case and that
the principles applied thereto “are not listed in order of importance; they
are not intended to be all-inclusive; and . . . facts and circumstances of a
particular case may render some of the principles inapplicable or worthy of
lesser or greater weight.” 73
The end result of these various policies, pronouncements, rules, and
regulations driving DOJ and SEC decision-making in the realm of
cooperation is that both agencies have tremendous discretion in how
they will deal with corporate entities choosing to cooperate with them.
Not only do both agencies have a substantial array of principles that
agrees to forego an enforcement action against the individual or company if the individual or
company agrees to, among other things: 1) cooperate truthfully and fully in the Commission’s
investigation and related enforcement actions; 2) enter into a long-term tolling agreement; 3)
comply with express prohibitions and/or undertakings during a period of deferred prosecution;
and 4) under certain circumstances, agree either to admit or not to contest underlying facts that
the Commission could assert to establish a violation of the federal securities laws.”).
71. Id. § 6.2.4 (“A non-prosecution agreement is a written agreement between the
Commission and a potential cooperating individual or company, entered in limited and
appropriate circumstances, that provides that the Commission will not pursue an enforcement
action against the individual or company if the individual or company agrees to, among other
things: 1) cooperate truthfully and fully in the Commission’s investigation and related
enforcement actions; and 2) comply, under certain circumstances, with express undertakings. If
the agreement is violated, the staff retains its ability to recommend an enforcement action to the
Commission against the individual or company without limitation.”).
72. Id. § 6.1.2.
73. Id. § 6.1.1. This statement appears under Section 6.1.1 of the Enforcement Manual,
addressing cooperation with respect to individuals. Id. While the same statement is not reprinted
in full under Section 6.1.2 of the Manual, which addresses cooperation with respect to
companies, one could argue that the statement nonetheless applies to both individuals and
companies alike. See id. § 6.1.2. Moreover, Section 6.1.2 of the Manual includes the following
statement, which is similar but nonetheless slightly less detailed and explicit than the statement
appearing under Section 6.1.1:
Since every enforcement matter is different, this analytical framework sets
forth general principles but does not limit the Commission’s broad discretion to
evaluate every case individually, on its own unique facts and circumstances.
Similar to the Commission’s treatment of cooperating individuals, credit for
cooperation by companies may range from taking no enforcement action to
pursuing reduced charges and sanctions in connection with enforcement
actions.
Id.
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they can apply and options through which to operationalize and
implement those principles, but they can (1) add principles and options
that do not yet exist, (2) emphasize any principle to whatever degree
they see fit, and (3) even ignore principles altogether.
The tension between the government and corporations, then, is a
fundamental one. On the one hand, government agencies such as the
DOJ and SEC are motivated to maximize discretion, autonomy, and
flexibility as they carry out their respective missions, including
enforcing statutes such as the FCPA.74 On the other hand, corporate
entities working to comply with the FCPA need specific and detailed
guidance and direction on how to effectively stay within legal and
regulatory bounds. This Article argues that the balance currently tilts
too heavily in favor of providing the agencies with discretion and
flexibility, thereby leaving corporate entities flailing as they try to figure
out how to best conform to the statute. This Article also attempts to
flesh out and advocate for changes necessary to even out the balance,
concluding that the DOJ and SEC will have to give up some of their
discretion and flexibility to ensure that companies have the necessary
guidance and information to make reasonable and strategic FCPA selfreporting decisions from a cost–benefit perspective.
III. THE CORPORATE SENTENCING CALCULUS
Chapter Eight of the Sentencing Guidelines, which governs the
sentencing of organizations,75 provides incentives for the voluntary
disclosure of potential FCPA violations.76 Specifically, courts assess the
culpability of a corporation in a given matter (determined as part of
calculating the “fine range” under the Sentencing Guidelines) by adding
up the corporation’s “Culpability Score”—a computation that starts
with a score of five.77 As a given entity’s Culpability Score increases, so
does the corresponding fine range. Courts can add points depending
upon the finding of one or more of the following: (1) “Involvement in or
Tolerance of Criminal Activity,”78 meaning that “an individual within
74. See Elizabeth Magill, Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 859, 900
(2009) (summarizing various theories of bureaucratic motivation and noting that agencies “seek
to maximize one or some of the following: their budget, neutral expertise, discretion,
bureaucratic autonomy, or leisure”).
75. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8 (2014) [hereinafter
GUIDELINES MANUAL], available at http://www.ussc.gov/guidelines-manual/2014/2014individual-chapters-pdf.
76. Id.
77. Id. § 8C2.5.
78. Id. § 8C2.5 (b).
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high-level personnel of the organization participated in, condoned, or
was willfully ignorant of the offense;”79 (2) “Prior History,” meaning
that the company engaged in similar conduct in the past;80 (3)
“Violation of an Order,”81 meaning that the offense violated a judicial
order82 or violated a condition of probation;83 and/or (4) “Obstruction of
Justice,”84 meaning that the company willfully obstructed justice
“during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant
offense.”85
Courts can also deduct points from the Culpability Score. There can
be a three-point deduction if the organization’s employees or agents
violated the FCPA “even though the organization had in place at the
time of the offense an effective compliance and ethics program.”86
However, this downward departure is not available if the organization
delayed reporting the offense.87 In addition, one, two, or five points can
be taken off the Culpability Score of corporations that self-report, that
cooperate fully, and that accept responsibility for their wrongdoing.88 If
the corporation does all three, there is a five-point deduction. If it
cooperates and accepts responsibility, there is a two-point deduction. If
it merely accepts responsibility, there is a one-point deduction.89 Thus,
the “value” of self-reporting is a three-point deduction from the
corporation’s Culpability Score.
To determine the corporate fine, however, courts use a five-step
process involving factors in addition to the Culpability Score. First, they
compute the seriousness of the offense, which represents the “base

79. Id. § 8C2.5 (b) (1) (A) (i).
80. Id. § 8C2.5 (c).
81. Id. § 8C2.5 (d).
82. Id. § 8C2.5 (d) (1).
83. Id. § 8C2.5 (d) (2).
84. Id. § 8C2.5 (e).
85. Id.
86. Id. § 8C2.5(f)(1). Some commentators have argued that the Sentencing Guidelines
have bolstered the creation and expansion of an FCPA compliance industry. See, e.g., Miriam H.
Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 993–99 (2009).
87. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 75, § 8C2.5(f)(2).
88. Id. § 8C2.5(g)(1)–(3); see also § 8C2.5(g) cmt. 13 (“[C]ooperation must be both
timely and thorough. To be timely, the cooperation must begin essentially at the same time as
the organization is officially notified of a criminal investigation. To be thorough, the
cooperation should include the disclosure of all pertinent information known by the
organization. A prime test of whether the organization has disclosed all pertinent information is
whether the information is sufficient for law enforcement personnel to identify the nature and
extent of the offense and the individual(s) responsible for the criminal conduct.”).
89. Id. § 8C2.5(g)(3).
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fine.”90 Second, courts assess the company’s culpability by adding up
the Culpability Score.91
Third, the court assigns the Culpability Score a minimum and a
maximum “multiplier.”92 The court then determines the fine range “by
multiplying the ‘base fine’ calculated under § 8C2.4 by both the
minimum multiplier calculated under § 8C2.6, which yields the
minimum of the ‘fine range,’ and by the maximum multiplier calculated
under § 8C2.6, which yields the maximum of the ‘fine range.’”93
Fourth, the court may consider a number of other factors, including
whether the company failed to have an effective compliance program,
whether there was any non-pecuniary loss caused by the transgression,
or whether there was any prior corporate misconduct by high-level
personnel that had not yet been considered.94 The court may also
differentiate between cases with offenses of varying seriousness and
with aggravating factors of varying intensity.95 Fifth, the court may
consider other factors that might lead to an upward or downward
departure, such as a corporation’s substantial assistance to the
government in conducting its investigation or in the investigation and
prosecution of another organization that has potentially committed a
crime.96
Reviewing the plea agreements and DPAs of several well-known
FCPA matters can provide a sense of how these various factors
influence the final outcomes of the cases, especially with respect to the
corporate fines. The following seven cases involve some of the largest
FCPA fines paid in U.S. history—four of the seven cases rank among
the “top ten” fines ever paid.97 They were all settled in the last ten years,
and for the sake of space, the discussion will only include the DOJ’s
90. Id. § 8C2.4.
91. Id. § 8C2.5.
92. Id. § 8C2.6.
93. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 75, § 8C2.7(a)–(b); see also U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N, OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, CHAPTER EIGHT FINE PRIMER: DETERMINING THE
APPROPRIATE FINE UNDER THE ORGANIZATIONAL GUIDELINES 5 (2013) [hereinafter CHAPTER
EIGHT FINE PRIMER], available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/primers/
Primer_Organizational_Fines.pdf. As an example, the Chapter Eight primer states: “[A]
Culpability Score of ten or more results in a minimum multiplier of 2.00 and a maximum
multiplier of 4.00, while a lower Culpability Score of three results in a minimum multiplier of
0.60 and a maximum multiplier of 1.20. . . . If the base fine is $85,000 and the Culpability Score
is five, the ‘base fine’ is multiplied by 1.00 to determine the minimum fine and by 2.00 to
determine the maximum fine, resulting in a ‘fine range’ of $85,000 to $170,000.” Id. at 5–6.
94. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 75, § 8C2.8(a).
95. CHAPTER EIGHT FINE PRIMER, supra note 93, at 6; see also GUIDELINES MANUAL,
supra note 75, § 8C2.8(b).
96. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 75, § 8C4.1(a).
97. See Cassin, supra note 7.
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handling of the case even in those instances where the SEC may also
have arrived at a disposition of the matter.98 In the first three cases
reviewed, the defendant elected to self-report, while in the next four
cases, the defendant failed to self-report.
A. Three FCPA Cases with Self-Reporting
This Section discusses the disposition of three cases involving
FCPA violations in which the defendant self-reported the violation. As
these cases illustrate, self-reporting does not guarantee a reduction in
the monetary penalty owed for the transgression.
1. United States v. Titan Corp.
In United States v. Titan Corp.,99 Titan pled guilty to violating antibribery provisions of the FCPA,100 to violating the books and records
provisions of the FCPA,101 and to aiding or assisting in the filing of a
fraudulent tax return.102 Titan agreed to pay a criminal fine of
$13,000,000, which is nearly the maximum of the Sentencing
Guidelines fine range calculated to be between $6,825,000 and
$13,650,000.103
The plea agreement provides very little information regarding how
the parties decided upon the amount Titan paid as a fine, stating only
that the fine reflected a consideration of the corporation’s conduct and
cooperation.104 The agreement also states that in calculating the
Culpability Score for Titan, the court deducted five points from the
score in accordance with Section 8C2.5(g)(1) of the Sentencing
Guidelines for Titan’s self-reporting, cooperation, and acceptance of
responsibility.105
2. United States v. ABB Ltd.
In United States v. ABB Ltd.,106 the defendant, ABB Ltd., entered
into a DPA with the DOJ. The government had charged ABB Inc. (a
98. See id.
99. See Plea Agreement, United States v. Titan Corp. (S.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2005) (No. 05CR-314-BEN), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/titan-corp/03-0105titan-plea.pdf.
100. Specifically, with violating 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1. Id. at 2.
101. Specifically, with violating 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2)(A) and 78m(b)(5). Id.
102. Specifically, with violating 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2). Id.
103. Id. at 23, 25.
104. Id. at 25.
105. Id.
106. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. ABB Ltd. (S.D. Tex. Sept. 29,
2010) (No. 410-cr-00665), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/abb/
09-29-10abbjordan-dpa.pdf.
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subsidiary of ABB Ltd.) with violating the anti-bribery provisions of the
FCPA,107 and had charged ABB Ltd.-Jordan (another subsidiary of
ABB Ltd.) with both wire fraud and violation of the books and records
provisions of the FCPA.108 As part of the DPA, ABB Ltd. agreed to pay
a total monetary penalty of $30,420,000, which is the very bottom of the
combined Sentencing Guidelines fine range calculated to be between
$30,420,000 and $60,200,000.109
The DPA provides very little information regarding how the parties
decided upon the monetary penalty, stating only that the amount was
proper due to ABB Ltd.’s “extraordinary cooperation” in the matter,
including sharing information with the DOJ “regarding evidence
obtained as a result of ABB Ltd.’s extensive investigation of corrupt
payments made by ABB subsidiaries in various countries around the
world.”110
3. Johnson & Johnson
In the matter of Johnson & Johnson (J&J),111 J&J entered into a
DPA with the DOJ. The government had charged DePuy, Inc. (a
subsidiary of J&J) with violating the anti-bribery provisions of the
FCPA.112 As part of the DPA, J&J agreed to pay a total monetary
penalty of $21,400,000, which is a 25% reduction off the bottom of the
Sentencing Guidelines fine range calculated to be between $28,500,000
and $57,000,000.113
The DPA provides very little information regarding how the parties
decided upon the monetary penalty, stating only that the amount was
appropriate given J&J’s “voluntary and thorough disclosure of the
misconduct at issue, the nature and extent of J&J’s cooperation in [the]
matter, penalties related to the same conduct in Greece and the United
Kingdom, J&J’s cooperation in the Justice Department’s investigation
of other companies, and J&J’s extraordinary remediation.”114

107. Specifically, with violating 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Id. at 1–2.
108. Specifically, with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1343 and 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2)(A),
78m(b)(5), and 78ff(a). Id.
109. See id. at 9–12.
110. Id. at 12.
111. Deferred Prosecution Agreement Between Johnson & Johnson, et al. and U.S. Dept.
of Justice, Criminal Division, Jan. 14, 2011, available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ fraud/
fcpa/cases/depuy-inc/04-08-11depuy-dpa.pdf.
112. Specifically, with violating 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2 and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Id.
113. Id. at 5.
114. Id.
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B. Four FCPA Cases Without Self-Reporting
This Section discusses four cases involving FCPA violations in
which the defendant failed to self-report. These cases illustrate that
failing to self-report does not necessarily mean that there will be no
reduction in the monetary penalty owed for the offense.
1. United States v. Alstom S.A.
In United States v. Alstom S.A.,115 the defendant pled guilty to one
count of violating the books and records provisions of the FCPA and
one count of violating the internal controls provisions of the FCPA.116
The defendant agreed to pay a criminal fine of $772,290,000, which is
quite close to the middle of the Sentencing Guidelines fine range
calculated to be between $532,800,000 and $1,065,600,000.117
With respect to “failure to self-report,” the plea agreement stated
that the defendant failed to voluntarily disclose its conduct “even
though it was aware of related misconduct at Alstom Power, Inc., a U.S.
subsidiary, which entered into a resolution for corrupt conduct in
connection with a power project in Italy several years prior to the
[Justice] Department reaching out to Alstom regarding its
investigation.”118
The DOJ, in accordance with the agency’s Principles of Prosecution,
considered several factors in determining the outcome of the case,
including (1) Alstom’s cooperation with the investigation; (2) the nature
and seriousness of Alstom’s offense; (3) Alstom’s compliance and
remediation; and (4) Alstom’s prior criminal misconduct.
With respect to “cooperation,” the defendant objected to cooperating
with the DOJ’s investigation for the first full year. The defendant then
started cooperating to a certain extent, but nonetheless impeded the
investigation by not cooperating fully.119 The defendant eventually
began to provide “thorough cooperation,” including assisting the DOJ in
investigating and prosecuting individuals and companies involved with
the defendant.120 However, this kind of cooperation did not begin until
after the DOJ charged several Alstom employees and executives.121
115. See Plea Agreement, United States v. Alstom S.A., (D. Conn. Dec. 22, 2014) (No.
3:14-cr-00246-JBA), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/
attachments/2014/12/22/alstom_sa_plea_agreement.pdf.
116. Id. at 1–2.
117. Id. at 12.
118. Id. at 13.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 13–14.
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With respect to the “nature and seriousness of the offense,” the
transgression took place over multiple years and involved bribing highlevel government officials.122 It also involved falsifying books and
records and failing to maintain adequate controls to prevent bribe
payments.123
With respect to “compliance and remediation,” Alstom did not have
an effective compliance program at the time of the transgression but
later made major efforts to improve its program and remediate
problems, thereby “substantially increasing its compliance staff,
improving its alert procedures, increasing training and auditing/testing,
and ceasing the use of external success fee-based consultants.”124 With
respect to “prior criminal misconduct,” the plea agreement states that
the corporation, through its subsidiaries, “entered into resolutions with
various other governments and the World Bank relating to similar
misconduct.”125
2. United States v. Siemens
In United States v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft,126 Siemens AG and
its subsidiaries Siemens, S.A. (Argentina), Siemens Bangladesh Ltd.,
and Siemens, S.A. (Venezuela) pled guilty to violating the FCPA’s
internal controls provisions as well as the FCPA’s books and records
provisions.127 Siemens Argentina pled guilty to violating the books and
records provisions of the FCPA, and Siemens Bangladesh and Siemens
Venezuela each pled guilty to violating both the FCPA’s anti-bribery
provisions as well as the books and records provisions.128
The defendants agreed to pay a criminal fine of $450,000,000, which
is substantially below the minimum of the Sentencing Guidelines fine
range calculated to be between $1.35 billion and $2.70 billion.129
The DOJ, in accordance with the agency’s Principles of
Prosecution,130 considered various factors in the overall disposition of
the case, including (1) Siemens’ cooperation and remediation efforts;
(2) the potential disproportionate harm to the shareholders, pension
122. Id. at 14.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See Department’s Sentencing Memorandum, United States v. Siemens
Aktiengesellschaft, (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008) (No. 1:08-cr-00367-RJL), available at
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2008/12/19/siemens-sentencing-memo.pdf.
127. Specifically, with violating 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m (b)(2)(B), 78m(b)(5), and 78ff(a). Id. at
10.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 10, 12.
130. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 50, at 9-28.300.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss5/4

24

Reilly and Reilly: Incentivizing Corporate America to Eradicate Transnational Briber

2015]

INCENTIVIZING CORPORATE AMERICA TO ERADICATE TRANSNATIONAL BRIBERY

1707

holders, employees, the public, and any other innocent third parties that
the case could impact; (3) whether and to what extent Siemens faced a
risk of debarment from government contracts; and (4) related cases of
other governmental authorities.131
With respect to Siemens’ “substantial assistance, cooperation, and
remediation efforts,” the sentencing memorandum states that the
penalties are appropriate based on how Siemens substantially assisted
the DOJ in related investigations, helped uncover evidence of prior
corruption within the company, and committed to remediate its
operations and improve transparency.132 With respect to “voluntary
disclosure,” the sentencing memorandum states that Siemens failed to
self-disclose and thus only received a two-point deduction to its
Culpability Score—“which is incongruent with the level of cooperation
and assistance provided by the company in the [DOJ’s]
investigation.”133
3. United States v. Alcoa World Alumina LLC
In United States v. Alcoa World Alumina LLC,134 the defendant pled
guilty to violating the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA.135 Alcoa
agreed to pay a criminal fine of $209,000,000, which is substantially
below the minimum of the Sentencing Guidelines fine range calculated
to be between $446,000,000 and $892,000,000.136 The plea agreement
stated that the fine was appropriate based on the following factors:
(1) the potential effect of a penalty on Alcoa’s financial
condition and ability to compete, “including, but not
limited to, its ability to fund its sustaining and improving
capital expenditures, its ability to invest in research and
development, its ability to fund its pension obligations, and
its ability to maintain necessary cash reserves to fund its
operations and meet its liabilities;”137
(2) the large remedy that the SEC imposed on the
Defendant’s majority shareholder, Alcoa, for its

131. Id. at 11.
132. Id. at 15.
133. Id. at 16.
134. See Plea Agreement, United States v. Alcoa World Alumina LLC (W.D. Penn. Jan. 9,
2014) (Criminal No. 14-7), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/alcoaworld-alumina/01-09-2014plea-agreement.pdf.
135. Specifically, with violating 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Id. ¶ 1.
136. Id. ¶¶ 7, 34.
137. Id. ¶ 35.
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involvement;138
(3) the appointment of a Special Committee by Alcoa’s
Board of Directors “to oversee an internal investigation by
independent counsel;”139
(4) the “substantial cooperation” provided by Alcoa,
including “conducting an extensive internal investigation,
voluntarily making employees available for interviews, and
collecting, analyzing, and organizing voluminous evidence
and information” for the DOJ;140
(5) the efforts by Alcoa to remediate the problems, which
included hiring ethics and compliance officers, as well as
implementing improved due diligence reviews;141 and
(6) Alcoa’s commitment to maintaining an effective anticorruption compliance program.142
4. United States v. Daimler AG
In United States v. Daimler AG, Daimler AG and its subsidiaries
DaimlerChrysler China Ltd. (DCCL), DaimlerChrysler Automotive
Russia SAO (DCAR), and Daimler Export and Trade Finance GmbH
(ETF) pled guilty to violating the books and records provisions of the
FCPA.143 The three subsidiaries—DCCL, DCAR, and ETF—pled guilty
to violating the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA.144 Daimler AG and
its subsidiaries agreed to pay a total criminal fine of $93,600,000, which
is approximately 20% below the minimum of the Sentencing Guidelines
fine range calculated to be between $116,000,000 and $232,000,000.145
The DOJ, in accordance with the Principles of Prosecution,
considered multiple factors when deciding the case, including (1)
Daimler’s cooperation and remediation efforts; (2) the potential
disproportionate harm to shareholders, pension holders, employees, the
public, and any other innocent third parties that the case could impact;
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Specifically, with violating 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2)(A), 78m(b)(5), and 78ff(a) as well
as 18 U.S.C. § 2. United States’ Sentencing Memorandum at 12, United States v. Daimler AG,
(D.D.C. Mar. 24, 2010) (No. 1:10-cr-00063-RJL), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/
fraud/fcpa/cases/daimler/03-24-10daimlerag-sent.pdf.
144. Specifically, with violating 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3. Daimler AG, 1:10-cr-00063-RJL, at
12–13.
145. Id. at 14.
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(3) whether and to what extent the defendants faced a risk of debarment
from government contracts, particularly “European Union Directive
2004/18/EC, which provides that companies convicted of corruption
offenses shall be mandatorily excluded from government contracts in all
EU countries.”146
With respect to “cooperation,” the sentencing memorandum states
that the lower fine amount is appropriate due to Daimler’s cooperation
in the DOJ investigation, such as revealing information about company
corruption in other countries.147 With respect to “voluntary disclosure,”
Daimler only received a two-point reduction in its Culpability Score
because it failed to self-report.148 The DOJ submitted that the point
reduction was “incongruent with the level of cooperation and
assistance” the company provided in DOJ’s investigation.149
C. Observations from the Seven Cases
In reviewing the disposition of these seven FCPA cases, it seems
clear that voluntary disclosure does not guarantee a reduction in
monetary penalties. Moreover, the failure to voluntarily disclose does
not preclude a corporation from receiving a reduction in monetary
penalties. Indeed, in both Siemens and Daimler AG, the sentencing
memorandum states that because the defendant failed to self-report the
matter, it would only receive a two-point reduction in its Culpability
Score.150 In both cases, however, the DOJ went on to state that such an
outcome was “incongruent with the level of cooperation and assistance
provided by the company in the Department’s investigation,” and the
defendant ultimately paid a fine substantially below the minimum of the
Sentencing Guidelines fine range. 151
These conclusions comport well with conclusions arrived at by other
FCPA scholars and researchers. For example, Professors Stephen Choi
and Kevin Davis, both faculty members of the New York University
School of Law, together conducted a quantitative analysis on a dataset
of FCPA cases resolved from 2004 to 2011. The scholars wanted to
determine if mitigating activity (whether self-disclosure, cooperation, or
146. Id. at 12.
147. Id. at 14.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Sentencing Memorandum at 16, United States v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, (D.D.C.
Dec. 12, 2008) (No. 1:08-cr-00367-RJL), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2014/12/22/alstom_sa_plea_agreement.pdf; United
States’ Sentencing Memorandum, at 14, United States v. Daimler AG, (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 2010)
(No. 1:10-cr-00063-RJL), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/
daimler/03-24-10daimlerag-sent.pdf.
151. Sentencing Memorandum, Daimler AG (No. 1:10-cr-00063-RJL), at 14.
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remediation) conducted by a given transgressing company led to
reduced sanctions by the federal government.152 After controlling for
important effects such as bribe amount, these investigators found “no
evidence to support the hypothesis that voluntary disclosure or
cooperation or remediation correlates with reduced total monetary
penalties.”153
Professors Choi and Davis analyzed the data using several different
models, each with different variables.154 Still, these scholars ultimately
arrived at the same conclusion: “[O]ur results do not support the view
that mitigating activities correlate with reduced FCPA penalties . . . .”155
Moreover, two other commentators arrived at similar findings. After
analyzing forty FCPA cases from 2002 to 2009, researcher Bruce
Hinchey concluded that “[t]he data evaluated here . . . give[s] support to
the notion that there is no benefit to voluntary disclosure in the
published cases.”156 Researcher Bruce Klaw concluded that “even when
companies do voluntarily disclose, a vast majority are nonetheless
subjected to substantial sanctions.”157 Specifically, Klaw concluded that
of those companies that self-reported FCPA violations to the DOJ and
SEC from the late 1990s to 2007, 86% of them subsequently faced
government enforcement action.158
Practitioners at a leading law firm arrived at a conclusion that
appears to square well with these findings. These attorneys stated that
while the DOJ and SEC threaten harsher penalties for corporations that
fail to self-report, “the objective evidence and the experience of
investigative and defense counsel during investigations suggest that the
outcome of an investigation depends most heavily on the seriousness of
the underlying facts, and less on whether or not the company selfreported those facts.”159
152. Stephen J. Choi & Kevin E. Davis, Foreign Affairs and Enforcement of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act 20 (Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series Working Paper
No. 12–35, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2116487.
153. Id. at 20.
154. Id. at 23.
155. Id. at 24.
156. Bruce Hinchey, Punishing the Penitent: Disproportionate Fines in Recent FCPA
Enforcements and Suggested Improvements, 40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 393, 399, 415 (2011) (emphasis
added).
157. Bruce W. Klaw, A New Strategy for Preventing Bribery and Extortion in International
Business Transactions, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 303, 338 (2012).
158. Id. at 338–39.
159. Charles Carberry et al., DOJ/SEC’s Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act: Jones Day Summary and Analysis, JONES DAY (Dec. 2012),
http://www.jonesday.com/doj_sec_resource_guide_to_fcpa/ (emphasis added); see also F.
Joseph Warin & Jason A. Monahan, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Due Diligence and
Voluntary Disclosure, J. PAYMENT SYS. L. 433 (2005) (noting that “voluntary disclosure of an
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IV. SELF-REPORTING AND THE RALPH LAUREN CORPORATION
While it is not ranked among the larger FCPA cases in terms of fine
size (as were the seven cases just discussed), the Ralph Lauren matter is
nevertheless important to review because of the largely uniform reaction
to the case by experts and commentators. Specifically, the disposition of
the matter is said to stand for the proposition that self-reporting’s
substantial benefits make it the most strategic course of action.160 This
Article challenges that assertion.
On April 22, 2013, the SEC announced an NPA with Ralph Lauren
Corporation in connection with bribes paid to government officials in
Argentina.161 After Ralph Lauren Corporation uncovered the
misconduct through an internal audit, it promptly self-reported it to the
SEC.162 The SEC did not charge the corporation with violations of the
FCPA because of the company’s response to the situation, which
included self-reporting promptly, providing thorough information to the
SEC, and cooperating in the SEC investigation.163
In announcing the decision, the acting Director of the SEC’s
Enforcement Division commended the company for its actions, stating:
“When they found a problem, Ralph Lauren Corporation did the right
thing by immediately reporting it to the SEC and providing exceptional
assistance in our investigation.”164 He added, “The NPA in this matter
makes clear that we will confer substantial and tangible benefits on
companies that respond appropriately to violations and cooperate fully
with the SEC.”165 Other experts and commentators arrived at similar
assessments of the matter, with headlines such as “Ralph Lauren Case
Shows the Benefits of Cooperation,”166 “Another Example of the
FCPA violation does not guarantee mitigation of civil and criminal penalties. Furthermore, the
SEC and DOJ may give greater weight to voluntary disclosure in some cases . . . than in other
cases”), available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/fstore/documents/pubs/Warin-MonahanFCPA-JPSL09.05.pdf.
160. See, e.g., Shannon Walker, A Case for Self-Reporting - Ralph Lauren Ethics Violation
Experience, WHISTLEBLOWER SEC., http://blog.whistleblowersecurity.com/blog/bid/288041/ACase-for-Self-Reporting-Ralph-Lauren-Ethics-Violation-Experience (last visited July 22, 2015).
161. Press Release, SEC Announces Non-Prosecution Agreement with Ralph Lauren
Corporation Involving FCPA Misconduct, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Apr. 22, 2013) [hereinafter
Ralph Lauren Press Release], available at http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/
PressRelease/1365171514780#.UrUm3ZqA2M8.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. (emphasis added).
166. Peter J. Henning, Ralph Lauren Case Shows the Benefits of Cooperation, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 29, 2013, 12:47 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/04/29/ralph-lauren-case-showsthe-benefits-of-cooperation/?_r=0.
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Benefits of FCPA Self-Reporting,”167 “Self-Reporting FCPA Violations
Pays Off: Just Ask Ralph Lauren,”168 and “Contrite Companies Can Be
Forgiven in Bribery Cases: Enforcers Look Kindly on Bribery Suspects
That ‘Fess Up.’”169
A. The Case Against Ralph Lauren Corporation
As outlined by the SEC, Ralph Lauren Corporation’s Argentine
subsidiary paid bribes to customs and government officials to assist in
importing products into Argentina.170 Paid through the company’s
customs broker, the bribes were to avoid necessary paperwork and to
avoid the inspection of prohibited products by customs officials.171 The
bribes to Argentine officials totaled $593,000 over a four-year period.172
Under the NPA, the company agreed to pay $593,000 in disgorgement
and $141,845.79 in prejudgment interest.173
Upon discovering the bribes, the company took immediate steps to
halt the wrongdoing, such as terminating its customs broker.174
Furthermore, the corporation reviewed its preexisting FCPA compliance
program and implemented measures to upgrade the program, including:
(1) amending the company anticorruption policy and translating it into
eight languages; (2) enhancing third-party due diligence procedures; (3)
modernizing policies for both gifts and commissions; and (4)
implementing employee anticorruption training.175 The company also
stopped retail operations in Argentina and began to end all other
operations there.176
Ralph Lauren Corporation also provided extensive cooperation to the
SEC and the DOJ, including providing a complete production (and
translation) of documents and disclosure of large amounts of
167. Jonathan Green, Another Example of the Benefits of FCPA Self-Reporting, LAW360
(Apr. 24, 2013, 2:41 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/435727/another-example-of-thebenefits-of-fcpa-self-reporting.
168. Self-Reporting FCPA Violations Pays Off: Just Ask Ralph Lauren, JDSUPRA (Apr. 24,
2013),
http://compliance.jdsupra.com/post/48778054353/self-reporting-fcpa-violations-paysoff-just-ask-ralph.
169. Amanda Bronstad, Contrite Companies Can Be Forgiven in Bribery Cases: Enforcers
Look Kindly on Bribery Suspects That ‘Fess Up,’ THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, May 15, 2013.
170. Ralph Lauren Press Release, supra note 161.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Non-Prosecution Agreement at Statement of Facts (Exhibit A) ¶ 12, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n and Ralph Lauren Corporation (Apr. 22, 2013) [hereinafter Ralph Lauren NPA],
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2013/2013-65-npa.pdf.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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information pertaining to its bribery activities in Argentina; making
witnesses available for interviews; and conducting an FCPA internal
review and risk assessment of its operations in Hong Kong, Italy, and
Japan, where no further transgressions were identified.177
B. Resolving Ralph Lauren Using a Non-Prosecution Agreement
Rather than indictment and trial, both the DOJ and SEC resolved the
Ralph Lauren matter through the use of NPAs. This is not unusual, as
the government resolves the vast majority of FCPA matters through
NPAs and DPAs; in fact, in the last twenty years, very few defendants
have gone to trial in FCPA matters.178 According to the DOJ, DPAs and
NPAs “occupy an important middle ground between declining [to
prosecute on the one hand] and obtaining [a] conviction [on the
other].”179 The fate of the accounting firm Arthur Andersen LLP
probably instilled within both prosecutors and corporations the belief
that serious collateral consequences surround corporate prosecutions.180
Many commentators have suggested that the “mere indictment” of
Arthur Andersen led to its closing—in the end, 28,000 people lost their
jobs.181 Indeed, it was partly the repercussions from the collapse of
Arthur Andersen that led the DOJ to “no longer see[] its role in the
corporate context as solely that of indicting, prosecuting, and punishing.
177. Id.
178. See Mike Koehler, FCPA 101: How Are FCPA Enforcement Actions Typically
Resolved?, FCPA PROFESSOR, http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/fcpa-101#q16 (last visited July 22,
2015) [hereinafter Koehler, FCPA 101] (“Nearly every FCPA enforcement action against a
company in this new era of FCPA enforcement is resolved through a non-prosecution
agreement . . . or a deferred prosecution agreement . . . .”).
179. General Considerations of Corporate Liability, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 928.200, available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/
28mcrm.htm; see also Greenblum, supra note 8 (“Deferred prosecution offers prosecutors an
intermediate option between declination and plea bargaining, as deferrals exact sanctions while
circumventing the collateral consequences of a conviction.” (citation omitted)).
180. See generally Indictment, United States v. Arthur Anderson, LLP, No. CRH-02-121
(S.D. Tex. Mar. 7, 2002).
181. Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Indicting Corporations Revisited: Lessons of the Arthur
Andersen Prosecution, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 107, 107 (2006); see also Elkan Abramowitz &
Barry A. Bohrer, The Debate About Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements, 248 N.Y. L.J.
(2012) (“While the reality is that corporations may not face the type of collateral consequences
suffered by Arthur Andersen, there is no question that fighting criminal charges can have a
tremendous impact on a corporation’s reputation and pocketbook.”). But see Gabriel Markoff,
Arthur Andersen and the Myth of the Corporate Death Penalty: Corporate Criminal
Convictions in the Twenty-First Century, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 797, 802 (2013) (challenging
prevailing notions regarding the collateral consequences of convicting corporate entities). Using
a database of organizational convictions, Gabriel Markoff comes to the conclusion that, from
2001 to 2010, no publicly traded company failed due to a conviction.
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Instead it is a vehicle effecting widespread structural reform within
corrupt corporate cultures.”182
C. The Fairness of Non-Prosecution Agreements
However, using DPAs and NPAs in resolving FCPA matters may
have a significant drawback: Companies may sometimes go along with
a DPA or NPA not because of actual wrongdoing or guilt, but rather
because they want to avoid the possibility of a negative outcome at trial.
As one commentator puts it:
[T]he ugly truth is that while the existence of [NPAs and
DPAs] can be welcome alternatives to an indictment,
combined with a virtually strict liability regime, they can
also permit the government to exact millions of dollars in
fines from companies that are genuinely without fault but
cannot afford to take the risk of an adverse outcome if they
take on the government.183
Another commentator suggests the current dynamic means that
corporate entities have “little practical choice” when faced with
choosing between indictment or accepting a DPA or an NPA.184 He
argues that this gives the government “enormous leverage” when
negotiating terms of the agreements, which can in turn result in
“prosecutorial overreaching” and deals that are unfair to corporate
defendants.185
In looking at the “deal terms” of such agreements, NPAs and DPAs
oftentimes require (1) significant and long-term governance changes
within the corporate entity, (2) admission of wrongdoing by the
company, (3) acceptance of a “statement of facts” setting forth the
company’s wrongful behavior, and (4) a prohibition upon the company
182. Thomas, supra note 35, at 454.
183. Jon May, The New British Invasion: Will the UK Bribery Act of 2010 Eclipse the
FCPA?, 36 CHAMPION 28, 31 (2012) (emphasis added) (quoting National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers Director of White Collar Policy, Shana-Tara Regon).
184. Matt Senko, Prosecutorial Overreaching in Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 19 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 163, 163–64 (2009); see also Barry J. Pollack & Annie Wartanian
Reisinger, Lone Wolf or the Start of a New Pack: Should the FCPA Guidance Represent a New
Paradigm in Evaluating Corporate Criminal Liability Risks? 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 121, 125
(2014) (“[A]s reluctant as the DOJ has become post-Arthur Andersen to prosecute criminal
charges against corporations, corporations have become even more reluctant to defend against
such charges. The result is that criminal charges or potential criminal charges against
corporations are almost always resolved by a negotiated resolution rather than through
litigation.”).
185. Senko, supra note 184, at 163–64.
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against making public statements that contradict admissions made in the
agreement.186 In the Ralph Lauren case, the company agreed to similar
significant and ongoing obligations. In addition to agreeing to pay
$593,000 in disgorgement and $141,845.79 in prejudgment interest,187
the corporation agreed to the following “cooperation” duties:
1. The Respondent, a corporation organized and operating
under the laws of Delaware, agrees to cooperate fully and
truthfully in the Investigation and any other related
enforcement litigation or proceeding to which the
Commission is a party (the “Proceedings”), regardless of
the time period in which the cooperation is required. In
addition, the Respondent agrees to cooperate fully and
truthfully, when directed by the Division's staff, in an
official investigation or proceeding by any federal, state, or
self-regulatory organization (“Other Proceedings”). The
full, truthful, and continuing cooperation of the Respondent
shall include, but not be limited to:
a. producing, in a responsive and prompt manner, all
non-privileged documents, information, and other
materials to the Commission as requested by the
Division's staff, wherever located, in the possession,
custody, or control of the Respondent;
b. using its best efforts to secure the full, truthful, and
continuing cooperation, as defined in Paragraph 3, of
current and former directors, officers, employees and
agents, including making these persons available, when
requested to do so by the Division's staff, at its expense,
for interviews and the provision of testimony in the
investigation, trial and other judicial proceedings in
connection with the Proceedings or Other Proceedings;
and
c. entering into tolling agreements, when requested to
do so by the Division's staff, during the period of
cooperation.
2. The full, truthful, and continuing cooperation of each
186. Jonathan S. Sack & Elizabeth Haines, Be Careful What You Wish For: How Deferred
and Non-Prosecution Agreements Can Be Used in Civil Litigation, BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 10,
2012), available at http://about.bloomberglaw.com/practitioner-contributions/deferred-and-nonprosecution-agreements/.
187. See Ralph Lauren Press Release, supra note 161.
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person described in Paragraph 2 above will be subject to
the procedures and protections of this paragraph, and
shall include, but not be limited to:
a. producing all non-privileged documents and other
materials as requested by the Division's staff;
b. appearing for interviews, at such times and places,
as requested by the Division's staff;
c. responding to all inquiries, when requested to do so
by the Division's staff, in connection with the
Proceedings or Other Proceedings; and
d. testifying at trial and other judicial proceedings,
when requested to do so by the Division's staff, in
connection with the Proceedings or Other Proceedings.188
Are these obligations unreasonably burdensome, vague, or expansive?
How much time and money will the company spend to comply with
these terms of the NPA agreement? While only the Ralph Lauren
Corporation can accurately determine whether the obligations cross the
line into being unfair or overreaching, one commentator has argued that
prosecutors, in crafting DPAs and NPAs, tend to employ “nonspecific
terms” that provide government investigators with “broad authority to
compel disclosure of information and force internal changes, while
leaving companies virtually defenseless.”189 He further suggests that
such terms “clearly favor the prosecutor” and that defendant companies
agree to them only because “they have no ammunition at the bargaining
table.”190
Perhaps increased judicial review of these agreements would provide
more protection for companies during the negotiation process. Unlike
DPAs, NPAs are not filed with a court of law, thereby escaping judicial
scrutiny that ensures the agreement is reasonable and fair. I have argued
in a separate article that judicial review should be incorporated into the
agreement-making processes of both NPAs and DPAs.191 After all, if
188. Ralph Lauren NPA, supra note 174, at ¶¶ 2–3.
189. Senko, supra note 184, at 184.
190. Id. at 177–78.
191. Peter Reilly, Negotiating Bribery: Toward Increased Transparency, Consistency, and
Fairness in Pretrial Bargaining Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 10 HASTINGS BUS.
L.J. 347, 394 (2014) (“With increased judicial review, not only would there be a more
reasonable balance of power between prosecutors and corporations during the negotiation phase
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the government can choose to negotiate a DPA that will be subject to
judicial scrutiny or can instead choose to negotiate an NPA that
bypasses judicial review and scrutiny altogether, it will have an
increased incentive to rely upon NPAs. Thus, both forms of agreements
should be subject to judicial review.
V. TOWARD AN FCPA SELF-REPORTING CALCULUS
The decision of whether to self-report a potential FCPA violation is
a strategically difficult one.192 There can be certain advantages to selfreporting. First, doing so allows a company to frame the issues and set a
tone for positive interaction with the government. This can include
emphasizing the strength and effectiveness of the company’s
compliance programs, policies, and procedures, as well as its
willingness to cooperate with the government.193 As one FCPA expert
put it, a voluntary disclosure “allow[s] the company to determine the
disclosure’s timing, waiting until it has fully investigated the violation
and undertaken remedial steps, thus showing a pro-active commitment
to compliance.”194 Another expert adds:
[S]elf-reporting impacts the dynamic between the company
and the U.S. government throughout the course of the
review. Self-reporting casts current management and the
board of directors in the best possible light under difficult
circumstances, giving defense counsel an opportunity to

of NPA and DPA deal making, but companies would be provided with guidance on how some
of the more vague FCPA provisions . . . will be construed by the courts. Moreover, judicial
review would ensure that DOJ’s claims and theories of corporate wrongdoing actually stand on
firm legal ground. Essentially, reviewing judges would help to locate and define that heretofore
elusive line separating lawful from unlawful conduct, thereby providing more certainty in both
FCPA compliance and enforcement.” (footnotes omitted)). See also Candice Zierdt & Ellen S.
Podgor, Corporate Deferred Prosecutions Through the Looking Glass of Contract Policing, 96
KY. L.J. 1, 14 (2007) (“Although negotiated resolutions offer enormous economic benefit, the
omission of judicial oversight raises concerns when the determination of whether there is a
breach of the agreement rests within the exclusive province of one party, and that party is the
government, a party with extraordinary power.”).
192. See Richard Marshall, Uuuhhh, Look, We Messed Up Here, CORP. COUNSEL, Jan. 28,
2010, available at https://www.ropesgray.com/~/media/Files/articles/2010/02/insights-for-inhouse-counsel-grappling-with-self-reporting.ashx (“The decision to self-report [an FCPA
matter] can be one of the most important decisions the company can make, and such important
decisions should never be made without careful reflection.”).
193. See Marsha Gerber et al., Voluntary Disclosure of FCPA Violations, 43 REV. SEC. &
COMMODITIES REG. 55, 63 (2010) (“[V]oluntary disclosure presents a tone of cooperation and
commitment to FCPA compliance.”).
194. See id.
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show the government at the very start of the review that the
company wishes “to do the right thing.”195
The government appears to agree with these assessments: Stephen L.
Cohen, Associate Director of the SEC’s Enforcement Division, has
stated that “[n]othing sets the tone differently than self-reporting versus
a phone call from us.”196
Second, companies might wish to reap the benefits of self-reporting
given that “[t]he risk of getting caught . . . is greater today than any
point previously.”197 As the SEC Enforcement Director Andrew
Ceresney put it: “Given all the means that we have for finding out about
misconduct . . . companies that choose not to self-report are taking a
significant gamble.”198 If the violation will likely come to light
regardless, then why not get credit for self-reporting? One reason for the
increased risk of “getting caught” is the whistleblower provisions
passed in 2011 as part of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and
195. Carberry, et al., supra note 159; see also Mary Jo White, Chairwoman, Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, Speech Before the Stanford University Rock Center for Corporate Governance: A
Few Things Directors Should Know About the SEC (June 23, 2014) available at
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370542148863#.VQjRQU10zcs (“The tone
and substance of the early communications we have with a company are critical in establishing
the tenor of our investigations and how the staff and the [SEC] will view your cooperation in the
final stages of an investigation.”).
196. Emmanuel Olaoye, Companies Will Be Treated Favorably If They Report Violations
First, SEC Enforcer Tells Lawyers, KNOWLEDGE EFFECT (Oct. 24, 2012), http://blog.
thomsonreuters.com/index.php/companies-will-be-treated-favorably-if-they-report-violationsfirst-sec-enforcer-tells-lawyers/.
197. Andrew Ramonas, The Perils of Keeping FCPA Infractions Under Wraps, CORP.
COUNSEL, Oct. 29, 2013 (quoting Charles Duross, then-deputy chief of DOJ’s FCPA unit, at the
2013 Los Angeles Association of Corporate Counsel’s Annual Meeting), available at
http://www.law.com/corporatecounsel/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202625548922&slreturn=201311
30211025; see also Timothy P. Peterson & Robertson Park, Regulatory: Deciding Whether to
Voluntarily Disclose a Potential FCPA Violation, INSIDE COUNSEL (May 29, 2013), available at
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2013/05/29/regulatory-deciding-whether-to-voluntarily-disclos
(“Companies must assume that the probability is greater now that a corruption issue will come
to the government’s attention, regardless of whether the company itself makes a voluntary
disclosure, and must take that assumption into account in any calculations regarding the
potential need for self-reporting.”).
198. See Ensign, supra note 4 (quoting an e-mail communication from Mr. Ceresney);
see also Marhsall L. Miller, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division,
U.S. DOJ, Remarks at the Global Investigation Review Program (Sept. 17, 2014), available
at http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/remarks-principal-deputy-assistant-attorney-generalcriminal-division-marshall-l-miller (discussing the employment of enforcement tools “that may
not have been used frequently enough in white collar cases in past years[,]” including wire taps,
body wires, border searches, and physical surveillance). Miller reports that these “proactive
investigative tools—previously used primarily in organized crime and drug cases—have become
a staple in our white collar investigations.” Id.
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Consumer Protection Act.199 Under that law, monetary awards
incentivize whistleblowers to be the first to report a violation.
Specifically, “the [program] rewards high-quality original information
that results in an SEC enforcement action with sanctions exceeding $1
million.”200 Awards can range from 10%–30% of the money collected
in a case.201
There are also policies written to incentivize culpable individuals to
report violations. While outright amnesty is unavailable to such
whistleblowers, the SEC will consider their efforts pursuant to its Policy
Statement on Cooperation.202 Overall, the program seems to have
increased in popularity: the number of whistleblower tips the SEC
receives annually increased from 3001 in fiscal year 2012, to 3620 in
fiscal year 2014.203 Since the program’s inception, the SEC has
authorized awards to fourteen whistleblowers—nine of them in fiscal
year 2014.204 On September 22, 2014, the SEC authorized the largest
award made by the program to date: more than $30 million to an
unidentified whistleblower who revealed ongoing fraud that the
government may not have detected without that help.205 Such awards
will likely lead to increased publicity for the program, as well as
increasing numbers of leads and tips.
Companies also discover potential FCPA violations during
increasingly aggressive mergers and acquisitions (M&A) due
diligence.206 When they find violations, the acquiring firm oftentimes
requires the target firm to self-disclose the violation to the government
so it can be fully addressed (i.e., they can pay monetary penalties, fire or
reprimand personnel, implement or enhance internal compliance
199. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.
Code).
200. Press Release, SEC Awards More Than $14 Million to Whistleblower, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n (Oct. 1, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/
PressRelease/1370539854258#.UsEJ3pqA2M8.
201. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. §78u-6 (2012).
202. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-15 (2014). The SEC states: “[W]e believe that the final rule
appropriately incentivizes culpable whistleblowers to report securities violations while
preventing culpable whistleblowers from financially benefiting from their own misconduct or
misconduct for which they are substantially responsible.” Securities Whistleblower Incentives
and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34300, 34350 (June 13, 2011).
203. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE DODDFRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 20 (2014).
204. Id. at 1.
205. Id. Sean McKessy, Chief of the Office of the Whistleblower, points out that the award
was “the fourth award to a whistleblower living in a foreign country, demonstrating the
program’s international reach.” Id.
206. See FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 27, at 28 (“[D]ue diligence reduces the risk
that the acquired company will continue to pay bribes.”).
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programs, etc.) before the merger or acquisition takes place.207 This
occurs because, while “[s]uccessor liability has not been squarely
addressed in [FCPA] enforcement actions over the last few
years[,] . . . avoiding such liability . . . has been a key driver of
corporate behavior.”208 Indeed, M&A deals have become more complex
and expensive as corporations have had to respond to an emerging
doctrine where “[i]ssues of successor liability mean that the past
improper practices of a target company may lead to problems for the
acquiring company.”209
Finally, the federal government might learn about potential FCPA
violations through mandatory disclosures in required SEC filings210 or
through increased cooperation with anticorruption regulators in foreign
countries.211 Consider a multinational company based in the United

207. Id. (noting that “the consequences of potential violations uncovered through due
diligence can be handled by the parties in an orderly and efficient manner through negotiation of
the costs and responsibilities for the investigation and remediation”).
208. Lucinda A. Low & John E. Davis, The FCPA in Investment Transactions, 1 FOREIGN
CORRUPT PRAC. ACT REP. § 5:23 (2d ed. 2010); see also FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 27,
at 28 (noting that the government will pursue successor (i.e., acquiring) companies only in
“limited circumstances, generally in cases involving egregious and sustained violations or where
the successor company directly participated in the violations or failed to stop the misconduct
from continuing after the acquisition.” Indeed, the government will “more often” pursue actions
against the predecessor (i.e., acquired) company, “particularly when the acquiring company
uncovered and timely remedied the violations or when the government’s investigation of the
predecessor company preceded the acquisition”).
209. Linda Braude & Jonathan Nelms, FCPA Compliance in Russia, 41 REV. SEC. &
COMMODITIES REG. 169, 176 (2008).
210. For example, the SEC requires public companies to certify in quarterly and annual
reports that “they have disclosed to the company’s outside auditors and to the audit
committee . . . any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees
who have a significant role in the internal controls.” Scott W. Mackay, The Framework for
Corporate Self-Governance: An Effective Ethics and Compliance Program, Address at the ABA
Business Spring Meeting (Feb. 11, 2003), in ABA BUS. L. SEC. NEWSL., Apr. 4, 2003, at 10–13,
available at http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/newsletter/0013/materials/aftermath.pdf.
211. See Gwendolyn L. Hassan, The Increasing Risk of Multijurisdictional Bribery
Prosecution: Why Having an FCPA Compliance Program Is No Longer Enough, 42 INT’L L.
NEWS 1 (2013) (setting forth several risk factors for multijurisdictional prosecution, including
(1) the increasing number of new antibribery and anticorruption laws across the globe; (2) the
strengthening of existing antibribery and anticorruption laws in other jurisdictions; (3) new
enforcement efforts in other jurisdictions; and (4) increasing prevalence of cross-border
antibribery and anticorruption investigations and enforcement); see also Kristine Robidoux et
al., Anti-Bribery Legislation and Enforcement Pose Increasing Risks, MONDAQ (Dec. 30, 2014),
http://www.mondaq.com/canada/x/362986/White+Collar+Crime+Fraud/Antibribery+legislation
+and+enforcement+pose+increasing+risks (noting that foreign anticorruption laws have
increased in both number and scope in recent years, and that many of the laws are
“extraterritorial in nature, and companies that find themselves offside anti-bribery laws in one
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States with operations throughout the world. If a foreign government
discovers corruption in a part of the company based within its own
borders, that government is likely to contact American anticorruption
regulators for assistance. This could lead to U.S. regulators initiating a
separate investigation.212 It follows that the more widespread the illegal
activity (in terms of the amount of money, geographic area, and number
of individuals involved), the more likely it is that the corruption will
come to light.213
Despite those clear advantages to self-reporting, there is nonetheless
a long list of possible negative consequences to doing so, including
reputational harm;214 decreasing stock prices;215 decreasing employee
morale;216 additional enforcement by foreign governments217 and
jurisdiction face the prospect of also being offside, and potentially prosecuted under, antibribery laws in other jurisdictions”).
212. See Choi & Davis, supra note 152 (“The DOJ and SEC do not appear to temper their
FCPA sanctions to take into account foreign regulators. It could be that the DOJ and SEC obtain
better evidence when a foreign regulator is involved, allowing the DOJ and SEC to construct a
stronger case leading to a higher sanction. Alternatively, an egregious FCPA violation may
attract both U.S. and foreign regulators, leading to the positive correlation between foreign
regulators and the U.S. sanction without implying any causation. Looking at country level data,
we find evidence that the SEC and DOJ impose disproportionately large sanctions against firms
from countries which have strong legal institutions and cooperation agreements with the DOJ or
the SEC . . . .”).
213. Gerber et al., supra note 193, at 60.
214. See, e.g., Consolidated Complaint for Violation of the Federal Securities Laws, at 56;
In re Titan, Inc. Securities Litigation, No. 04-CV-0676-LAB(NLS) (S.D. Cal. 2004) (“Moody’s
has placed The Titan Corporation . . . on review for possible downgrade to reflect concerns
about its reputation and cash flow from the impact of the company’s alleged violation of
provisions set forth in the [FCPA].” (emphasis added) (quoting Moody’s Places the Titan
Corporation on Review for Possible Downgrade, MOODY’S (July 1, 2004),
https://www.moodys.com/research/MOODYS-PLACES-THE-TITAN-CORPORATION-ONREVIEW-FOR-POSSIBLE-DOWNGRADE--PR_83855)).
215. Raymund Wong & Patrick Conroy, FCPA Settlements: It’s A Small World After All,
ECON.
RESEARCH
ASSOCS.
(Jan.
28,
2009),
12,
available
at
NAT’L
http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/archive1/Pub_FCPA_Settlements_0109_
Final2.pdf (“[I]n some instances the implication of an alleged FCPA violation is considered
serious by the market, over and above what one might expect given the magnitude of any
disgorgements, fines, or penalties paid. For example, when Syncor International Corporation
announced to the public that it was investigating suspicious payments in Asia that may have
violated the FCPA, its stock price plummeted almost 45% on a market-adjusted basis, implying
a loss of $343 million in market capitalization, despite the relative small amount paid in its
eventual settlement with the SEC and the DOJ.”).
216. See Gerber et al., supra note 193, at 10 (noting that self-reporting “negatively affects
the company’s reputation and employee morale”).
217. See Matteson Ellis, Top FCPA Enforcement Trends to Expect in 2015, CORPORATE
COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS (Jan. 23, 2015), http://www.corporatecomplianceinsights.com/top-fcpaenforcement-trends-expect-2015/ (discussing the increased focus upon bribery investigations by
foreign governments: “They are targeting individuals, as evidenced by Brazil’s focus on former
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multilateral development banks,218 both of which can be assisted
through multi-jurisdictional treaties and cooperation efforts;219 the filing
of private civil suits, thereby exposing individual executives to FCPA
liability and reputational damage;220 civil class actions and shareholder
executives of Embraer and Petrobras and Canada’s investigation of former employees of the
engineering firm SNC-Lavalin. They are reaching blockbuster settlements with companies, such
as the recent US $240 million enforcement action by Dutch authorities against SBM Offshore
for bribery offenses in Brazil, Angola and Equatorial Guinea. They are pursuing high-profile
targets, such as the ongoing investigation by the UK’s Serious Fraud Office into Rolls-Royce’s
activities in China and Indonesia”). See generally Hassan, supra note 211 (noting that
“anticorruption efforts in other countries have seen a marked increase”).
218. See Leonard McCarthy, Dealing with Corruption in Development: What Works and
What Comes Next?, in WORLD BANK INTEGRITY VICE PRESIDENCY (INT) ANN. UPDATE 2013, at
3, 7–8, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDOII/Resources/5888891381352645465/INT_Annual_Update_FY13_WEB.pdf (discussing the bank’s dedication to
investigating and prosecuting corruption and other illicit practices in bank-financed projects).
219. In an FCPA case brought against Hewlett-Packard, for example, the DOJ and SEC
worked with the Public Prosecutor’s Office in Dresden, Germany; the DOJ also acknowledged
“significant assistance” from the Polish Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, the Polish AntiCorruption Bureau, and “the contributions of our law enforcement partners in other countries
involved in this matter.” Press Release, Dep’t. of Justice, Hewlett-Packard Russia Agrees to
Plead Guilty to Foreign Bribery (Apr. 9, 2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/hewlett-packard-russia-agrees-plead-guilty-foreign-bribery; see Press Release, U.S. Secs.
& Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Hewlett-Packard with FCPA Violations (Apr. 9 2014),
available at http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370541453075#.
VQ26zU10zcs; see also Mary Jo White, The Challenge of Coverage, Accountability and
Deterrence in Global Enforcement, Remarks at the IOSCO 39th Annual Conference (Oct. 1,
2014)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/
1370543090864#.VMrHqyxrWew) (“Rarely is there a week when one or more of the cases
recommended by the enforcement staff does not involve critical international assistance. In fact,
in the last fiscal year, the SEC made more than 900 requests for international assistance and, as
a result, we were able to obtain critical evidence that helped us prosecute wrongdoers for a vast
array of serious offenses.”); Sung-Hee Suh, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Implications for
U.S. Law on EU Practice, Remarks at the Practising Law Institute’s 14th Annual Institute on
Securities Regulation in Europe (2015) (transcript available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/
pr/deputy-assistant-attorney-general-sung-hee-suh-speaks-pli-s-14th-annual-institute-securities)
(discussing international bribery as well as international securities and commodities fraud). Suh
stated that the DOJ is “increasingly coordinating with domestic and foreign regulators and law
enforcement counterparts” and that the DOJ is “building and relying upon . . . relationships with
our foreign counterparts to gather evidence, locate individuals overseas, conduct parallel
investigations of similar conduct, and, when appropriate, coordinate the timing and scope of
resolutions[,] . . . including accounting for the corporate monetary penalties paid in other
jurisdictions when appropriate.” Id.
220. An expert testifying on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce stated to Congress:
When companies and their senior officers and directors face personal civil
liability in addition to any exposure to the DOJ and SEC, their judgments
regarding what issues to investigate and what results to report to the DOJ and
SEC necessarily will be affected, possibly to the detriment of the integrity of
the government’s investigation.
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litigation against the company;221 and, for government contractors,
suspension or debarment.222
Any of these possible negative consequences of self-reporting could
lead to increased expenditures in time, energy, and money for the
company involved, especially when self-reporting results in wider
government investigations. After a company self-reports a possible
FCPA violation, the federal government will sometimes conduct its own
independent investigation (albeit at the expense of the self-reporting
company)—a process that can cost hundreds of thousands (if not
millions) of dollars and take many months (if not years) to complete.223

Can We Sue Our Way to Prosperity?: Litigation’s Effect on America’s Global Competitiveness:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong.
41 (2011) (statement of John H. Beisner, Skadden, Arps L.L.P., testifying on behalf of the U.S.
Chamber Institute for Legal Reform), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG112hhrg66540/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg66540.pdf.
221. In shareholder litigation, plaintiffs sue alleging that bribery or corruption caused
inaccurate pricing of stocks because of the benefits from bribery. In recent years, shareholders
and former employees have sued corporations under securities laws, alleging that they
purchased shares at inflated prices. See Khadijah M. Britton, Avon Shareholders’ FCPA China
Bribe Class Action Tossed, LAW360 (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.law360.com/
articles/581981/avon-shareholders-fcpa-china-bribe-class-action-tossed
(discussing
the
dismissal of a class action lawsuit by Avon Products Inc. shareholders that accused the company
and its senior executives of falsely inflating stock prices by hiding violations of the FCPA);
Michael Volkov, Additional Costs Of FCPA Investigations—Collateral Litigation, JDSUPRA
BUS. ADVISOR (Sept. 9, 2013), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/additional-costs-of-fcpainvestigations-29362/ (discussing the difference between the shareholder derivative action and
the shareholder class action, and noting that “[t]ypically, plaintiffs launch these cases
immediately after an FCPA investigation is disclosed. . . . In one particular situation, 23
individual shareholder actions were filed within two weeks of the disclosure of an FCPA
investigation”); see also Nick Thornton, Avon Faces Class-Action ‘Stock-Drop’ Suit,
BENEFITSPRO (Jan. 8, 2015), http://www.benefitspro.com/2015/01/08/avon-faces-class-actionstock-drop-suit (discussing a class action “stock drop” lawsuit against Avon Products Inc. by
participants in company retirement plans in which plaintiffs allege that Avon should have frozen
its purchase of company stock for the retirement plans as it was being investigated under the
FCPA).
222. Under guidelines put forth by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget, individuals
or firms that violate the FCPA can have their export licenses suspended, or they might be barred
from doing business with the federal government. See 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-2 (2013); see also
Lucinda A. Low et al., The European Commission’s First Biannual EU Anti-Corruption Report,
STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP n.6 (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.steptoe.com/publications-9420.html
(noting that, in U.S. v. Siemens AG, the DOJ charged Siemens with violating the FCPA’s books
and records provisions instead of bribery in part to avoid the damaging collateral consequences
of a bribery conviction, including mandatory permanent debarment in the EU).
223. See Ensign, supra note 4 (noting that Avon Products Inc. “ha[s] spent approximately
$350 million on legal and other fees tied to” the government investigation surrounding an FCPA
matter); see also Jacqueline C. Wolff & Pamela Sawhney, FCPA Voluntary Disclosures: A
Risk/Benefit Analysis, COVINGTON & BURLING LLP 3 (2007), http://www.cov.com/files/
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Since the government will likely decide the direction, speed, and
aggressiveness of these investigations, companies need to carefully
consider the implications of ceding this kind of power and control to the
government; indeed, “the company may find itself in unwanted and
unpleasant situations, such as helping the government prosecute a
formerly valued employee or even a valued customer or business
partner.”224
Moreover, these investigations can be difficult and complex. They
can involve third-party agents, subcontractors, and subsidiaries located
in other regions or countries.225 They can lead to government inquiries
regarding other transactions, deals or projects, other accounting entries,
and other internal investigations that the company has carried out.226
This, in turn, can lead to government findings of unlawful activities
beyond (or in addition to) bribery, including tax violations, government
contracting violations, or export control violations. Costs to the
company can include employee time spent gathering data, organizing
documents, and talking with investigators, as well as time spent hiring
Publication/97ca6c31-614b-4ace-a441-6dab61135c65/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/
3980bda8-c3b1-4f62-9df9-7845d53e1764/FCPA%20Voluntary%20Disclosures%20-%20A%
20Risk-Benefit%20Analysis.pdf (noting that the ensuing government investigation “tends to be
significantly broader than the violation disclosed. A disclosure of a few improper payments by a
small subsidiary in a small market can become a government investigation into the parent’s
worldwide activities—all paid for by the disclosing company”).
224. Marshall, supra note 192, at 2.
225. See WORLD ECON. FORUM, GOOD PRACTICE GUIDELINES ON CONDUCTING THIRDPARTY DUE DILIGENCE 6 (2013), available at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_PACI_
ConductingThirdPartyDueDiligence_Guidelines_2013.pdf
(discussing
the
importance
“conduct[ing] reasonable due diligence before entering into a business relationship” with agents,
advisors, subsidiaries, contractors, subcontractors, suppliers, etc., as well as the importance of
“undertak[ing] appropriate measures to ensure that the third party does not engage in improper
conduct”).
226. Arguably internal investigations constitute privileged information in accordance with
Upjohn Co. v. United States. See 449 U.S. 383, 401–02 (1981). However, in some jurisdictions
if the company has shared written reports of such investigations with auditors, which is a
common practice, then the company may have waived any privilege. See Thomas R. Mulroy &
Eric J. Munoz, The Internal Corporate Investigation, 1 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L. J. 49, 61 (2002)
(“[A]ttorney-client communications disclosed to third parties, not for the purpose of assisting
the attorney in rendering legal advice, lose their privilege. Privilege-waiving disclosures to third
parties can arise in a number of contexts, including disclosure of materials to: a client’s
underwriter and accountant; a corporation’s investment banker; one’s adversary in separate
litigation, even if under a confidentiality agreement; and a witness in preparation for testimony.”
(emphasis added)); see also In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 756 F.3d 754, 756–57 (D.C. Cir.
2014) (preserving the core holding of Upjohn by ruling that, in the context of an internal
company investigation, the attorney–client privilege applies to confidential communications
between a company’s attorneys and its employees as long as a primary purpose of the
communication was providing or obtaining legal advice).
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outside legal counsel, accountants, and consultants to assist with the
investigation.227
Finally, an investigation by one federal agency could very well
expand into a multi-agency investigation. For example, after it
completes its own investigation, the SEC has the ability to refer a matter
to law enforcement authorities if it believes there is evidence of a
willful violation,228 and federal securities laws authorize the SEC to
share evidence—including its own investigation files—with the DOJ for
this purpose.229 While the SEC’s guidance on cooperation sheds very
little light on the factors that would lead the SEC to make such referrals,
it seems likely that the factors considered would be (1) the amounts of
money involved; (2) the severity and pervasiveness of the transgression;
and (3) the cooperator’s level of culpability.230 Nevertheless, there
should be more guidance from the government on this matter because it
certainly plays a role in calculating the risks and rewards of selfreporting violations and cooperating thereafter.
CONCLUSION
The federal government needs to be more transparent and
forthcoming regarding exactly what the benefits will be when corporate
entities elect to self-report FCPA violations. Although the risks
associated with voluntary disclosure tend to be concrete and predictable,
the rewards have been largely uncertain. Ultimately, the government
considers many factors in addition to self-reporting when dealing with a
FCPA matter.231 The DOJ and SEC must be more transparent about the

227. See Ceresney, Conference Remarks, supra note 5 (noting that in the Layne
Christensen FCPA matter “the company provided real-time reports of its investigative findings,
produced English language translations of documents, made foreign witnesses available, and
shared summaries of witness interviews and forensic reports”); see also Press Release, U.S.
DOJ, Avon China Pleads Guilty to Violating the FCPA by Concealing More Than $8 Million in
Gifts to Chinese Officials (Dec. 17, 2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/avonchina-pleads-guilty-violating-fcpa-concealing-more-8-million-gifts-chinese-officials (noting that
the company performed numerous tasks that were helpful to the DOJ, “including conducting an
extensive internal investigation, voluntarily making U.S. and foreign employees available for
interviews, and collecting, analyzing, translating and organizing voluminous evidence”).
228. 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(b) (2013); see also ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 66, § 5.6
(noting authority to refer matters to other regulatory and disciplinary bodies).
229. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b), 78u(d)(1) (2012).
230. John A. Nathanson & Jason M. Swergold, SEC’s Cooperation Initiative: Should
You Go Along to Get Along? N.Y.L.J. (Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/
id=1202619610358/SECs-Cooperation-Initiative-Should-You-Go-Along-to-Get-Along (subscription
required).
231. As discussed in Part III, supra, federal prosecutors have a large amount of discretion
in deciding what to do with potential FCPA violators—whether to prosecute at all, what charges

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015

43

Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 5 [2015], Art. 4

1726

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

weight they will give (or not give) to voluntary disclosure versus other
factors. If benefits were quantified and linked to specific factors
involved in DOJ and SEC decision-making, companies would have a
more accurate sense of what it means when a government official says
that self-reporting is “a huge factor”232 in deciding whether and how to
prosecute a company, that there will be “meaningful credit”233 for
companies that provide voluntary disclosure, or that self-reporting
wrongful FCPA conduct is “always” 234 in the company’s best interest.
Part of the difficulty is the lack of traditional FCPA jurisprudence.
Because most cases are settled through NPAs and DPAs,235 little
guidance exists regarding the interpretation of the FCPA and its
application to various fact patterns and real-life situations. Without
trials, jury verdicts, and appellate court decisions, legal precedent is not
being developed in this area of the law. According to one commentator,
such precedent is crucial because it allows courts to “clarify the
boundaries of permissible legal conduct by resolving questions of
ambiguity and vagueness; striking down overreaching laws as
unconstitutional; and signaling to legislators where legal gaps exist.”236
While the DOJ and SEC published a much-anticipated guidebook
regarding the statute in November of 2012 (FCPA Resource Guide),237
that publication was said to “break[] little new ground” in shedding light
on what can sometimes be a subtle and complicated area of the law.238

to bring if prosecution moves forward, and how much of a penalty discount to give if there is a
negotiated resolution.
232. See Ensign, supra note 4 (quoting James Koukios, Senior Deputy Chief of the Justice
Department’s Criminal–Fraud Section).
233. Koehler, World Bribery, supra note 3 (quoting Charles Duross, then-Deputy Chief of
the DOJ’s Criminal–Fraud Section).
234. Ceresney, Conference Remarks, supra note 5.
235. See Koehler, FCPA 101, supra note 178 (“Nearly every FCPA enforcement action
against a company in this new era of FCPA enforcement is resolved through a non-prosecution
agreement . . . or a deferred prosecution agreement . . . .”).
236. Allen R. Brooks, Comment, A Corporate Catch-22: How Deferred and NonProsecution Agreements Impede the Full Development of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 7
J. L. ECON. & POL’Y 137, 155 (2010); see Pollack & Reisinger, supra note 184 (discussing how
litigated cases “provide judicial opinions regarding what conduct violates the criminal laws and
what does not. Thus, in addition to the criminal statutes themselves, corporations and
individuals (at least those advised by competent counsel) would have guidance available to them
in the form of judicial opinions providing elaboration as to what specific fact patterns
constituted criminal behavior and, likewise, what fact patterns did not”).
237. See supra note 27.
238. Kevin J. Harnisch et al., The Disappearing Exception for Facilitating Payments, N.Y.
L.J. (Feb. 11, 2013), available at http://friedfrank.com/siteFiles/Publications/NYLJ%20%20Harnisch-Witzel-Roth%20Feb%202013.pdf.
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In the FCPA Resource Guide, the government says it places a “high
premium” on self-reporting.239 However, the guide then merely sets
forth relevant provisions of the DOJ’s Principles of Prosecution, the
Sentencing Guidelines, and the SEC’s Seaboard Report and
Enforcement Manual.240 Numerous national and international business
advocacy groups and associations have suggested that the government
should publish a discussion of the application of those provisions and
principles to realistic (even if hypothetical) business scenarios and
situations.241 Again, such a discussion should include objective, detailed
information on how the government weighs each individual factor of
self-reporting, cooperation, remedial measures, and other relevant
factors. And it should also include more detailed information regarding
how, when, and why the DOJ or SEC might decide upon prosecuting
particular FCPA matters versus offering declinations, plea deals, or pretrial diversion agreements such as DPAs or NPAs.242 A small amount of
progress has been made in this direction regarding declination
decisions: the DOJ and SEC have been a bit more forthcoming in the
last several years regarding when and why they have decided to decline
pursuing a particular FCPA matter.243 However, the limited progress
239. FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 27, at 54.
240. Id. at 54–56.
241. See Letter from U.S. Chamber of Commerce and thirty-two other business groups and
associations, to Lanny A. Breuer, then-Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S.
DOJ, and George S. Canellos, then-Acting Director of Enforcement, U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (Feb. 19, 2013). The letter responded to the December 2012 publication
of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Resource Guide, available at
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/Coalition_Letter_to_DOJ_and_SEC_re_
Guidance_2-19-13.pdf.
242. Id.
243. In 2014, four declinations involved companies that had self-reported possible FCPA
violations to the government. These companies included Image Sensing, LyondellBassell,
Layne Christensen, and SBM Offshore. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Alert, WILMERHALE 11–
12
(Jan.
27,
2015),
https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/
Editorial/Publications/WH_Publications/Client_Alert_PDfs/FCPA%20YIR%20Alert_01%2027
%2015.pdf. However, given the limited amount of information made available to the public, it is
difficult to determine with any kind of certainty or specificity the reasoning behind the
government’s decisions. While it seems clear that self-reporting the potential violations played a
role in the final outcomes, it is impossible to know how the DOJ weighted that particular
element against other elements of cooperation also factored into the decision-making process.
For example, in the Layne Christensen case, the public learned little more than the fact that the
DOJ declined to prosecute based on self-disclosure and exemplary cooperation and significant
remediation. The question that needs to be addressed is: How were each of these elements
weighted when the DOJ was making its final decision? See Russ Berland, Brian O’Bleness &
Shellie Clausen, Showing Leadership: Layne’s Journey from FCPA Investigation to DOJ
Declination, ASS’N OF CORPORATE COUNSEL 6–8 (Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.acc.com/
chapters/midam/upload/2014-10-08_Stinson-Leonard_Street_PPTX-KS-NE.pdf. In the Image
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made in the narrow and focused area of declinations must expand to the
broader issues discussed in this Article. Companies need greater
transparency regarding the specific benefits that the government will
provide to reward particular cooperative behaviors that companies
exhibit.
Moreover, businesses and their advocacy groups and associations are
not the only ones calling for increased transparency in this regard.
During the past decade, a number of scholars and former high-ranking
SEC and DOJ officials have put forth proposals to amend the FCPA in
various ways.244 Not only has the government failed to take meaningful
Sensing case, the public learned through a company press release that the DOJ declined to
pursue the matter due to the company’s “voluntary disclosure, thorough investigation,
cooperation and voluntary enhancements to its compliance program.” Again, members of the
public need access to additional information if they want to have the ability to assess how each
individual factor was weighted in the DOJ’s decision-making process. See ISS Announces
Completion of Department of Justice Investigation, IMAGE SENSING SYS. (Sept. 8, 2014),
http://www.imagesensing.com/company/news-and-events/140908.html. This same weakness
occurs with the information on declinations set forth by the DOJ and the SEC in their 2012
FCPA Resource Guide, which provides six anonymized examples of FCPA matters in which the
government declined to take enforcement action. All six examples share the following five
elements: (1) the company self-reported the potential violation to the government; (2) the
company undertook an internal investigation; (3) the company took immediate action to halt the
wrongdoing; (4) the company cooperated fully with the government; and (5) the company in
some way strengthened compliance, either through remedial compliance training or through
specific upgrades to its current compliance program. While this information is helpful, it is,
again, impossible for one to discern how the government weighted each individual element
mentioned in its decision-making process. See FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 27, at 77–79.
244. See, e.g., Judge Stanley Sporkin, Speech at the ABA National Institute on the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act: Origins of the FCPA (Oct. 16, 2006), available at
http://www.nacdl.org/WorkArea/ DownloadAsset.aspx?id=21764&libID (proposing an FCPA
“immunization-inoculation program” that would “serve the dual purpose of: (1) creating suitable
incentives to compliance-minded companies to adopt and maintain high ethical standards in the
conduct of their business; and (2) reducing the case load and investigative burden of
governmental agencies that enforce the FCPA while reassuring regulators that companies are
taking active steps to limit corruption in their foreign contracting and other activities”); James
R. Doty, Toward a Reg. FCPA: A Modest Proposal for Change in Administering the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 62 BUS. L. 1233, 1233–34 (2007) (former SEC General Counsel
advocating for a “Reg. FCPA” and a “new approach to administration of the FCPA, one that
would provide a measure of regulatory certainty to public companies regarding the elements of
good faith compliance. The policy issue before us in the FCPA area is not whether the cases that
are being charged and prosecuted can be brought consistent with the standards of the statute;
rather, the issue is whether our law enforcement agencies should be left to devise their own,
case-by-case interpretation of the FCPA, without the rigor of greater regulatory clarity and the
benefits of more consistent administrative interpretation” (emphasis added)); Stephen A. Fraser,
Introduction to Placing the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on the Tracks in the Race for
Amnesty, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1009 (2012) (suggesting that the government implement an FCPA
amnesty program similar to that of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division, where
transgressing companies are able to calculate the discounts they would likely receive through
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steps toward implementing any of the proposals, it has also failed to
address the underlying, unifying issue that appears to motivate these
proposals: The need for increased guidance and certainty for businesses
worldwide that are attempting to abide by a rather complex and
sometimes confusing statute. While the government need not implement
any proposed changes that might somehow weaken the current
statute,245 it does need to heed this clarion call for increased
transparency.
The FCPA guidance and transparency sought by businesses,
academics, former high-ranking government officials, and others within
cooperation); Mike Koehler, Revisiting A Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Defense,
2012 WIS. L. REV. 609, 659 (arguing that the implementation of an FCPA compliance defense
would “better incentivize more robust corporate compliance, reduce improper conduct, and
further advance the FCPA's objective of preventing bribery of foreign officials”); Robert W.
Tarun & Peter P. Tomczak, Introductory Essay: A Proposal for a United States Department of
Justice Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Leniency Policy, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 153, 156 (2010)
(advocating for a DOJ “Fraud Section FCPA leniency policy modeled after the Antitrust
Division’s . . . Corporate Leniency Program”); id. at 172 (citing George J. Terwilliger, Proposed
Change in DOJ Policy: Presumption of No Criminal Disposition for Voluntary Disclosure,
Prepared Remarks for the Marcus Evans FCPA & Anti-Corruption Compliance Conference
(June 23, 2010) (former Deputy Attorney General outlining an FCPA amnesty policy in which
“there would be a presumption against criminal prosecution or disposition for organizations that
voluntarily disclose wrongdoing and thereafter cooperate with the government by, for example,
providing the results of an internal investigation and/or cooperating with additional government
investigation”)); Larry D. Thompson, In-Sourcing Corporate Responsibility for Enforcement of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 199, 216–17 (2014) (former Deputy
Attorney General proposing that (1) “if a corporation establishes a comprehensive, fully funded,
adequately staffed and trained FCPA compliance program, then the rogue employee who
circumvents it and violates the FCPA . . . should be deemed to be acting outside the realm of his
corporate responsibilities and the self-reporting corporation should not be held criminally liable
for his misconduct” and (2) “that a genuinely cooperative, self-reporting company with a proper
compliance program must be assured that it will not be debarred from contracting with the
United States government or receiving the government permits required to run its operations”).
245. See, e.g., David Kennedy & Dan Danielsen, Busting Bribery: Sustaining the Global
Momentum of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, OPEN SOC’Y FOUNDS. 31 (2011), available at
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/Busting%2520Bribery2011September
.pdf (arguing that “[c]reating a ‘compliance defense’ to knowing and intentional violations of
the Act would amount to eliminating criminal liability under the Act all together by permitting a
‘fig leaf’ compliance program to insulate companies from knowing and intentional wrongdoing”). But see Koehler, supra note 244, at 659 (“A company’s pre-existing FCPA compliance
policies and procedures and its good-faith efforts to comply with the FCPA should be relevant
as a matter of law—not merely in the opaque, inconsistent, and unpredictable world of DOJ
decision making—when a non-executive employee or agent acts contrary to those policies and
procedures. An FCPA compliance defense would not eliminate corporate criminal liability
under the FCPA or reward ‘fig leaf’ or ‘purely paper’ compliance. Rather, an FCPA compliance
defense, among other things, will better incentivize more robust corporate compliance, reduce
improper conduct, and further advance the FCPA’s objective of preventing bribery of foreign
officials. The time is right to revisit an FCPA compliance defense.”).
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the general public is the very kind of information that would naturally
come to light if trials, jury verdicts, and appellate court decisions were
the norm in this area of law. But since such verdicts and court decisions
are not the norm in FCPA matters, and since courts are not generating
legal precedent and providing the guidance, the federal government
should be more aggressive in stepping in to fill the void. In other words,
because the courts currently play such a negligible role in interpreting
and applying the FCPA, it is the federal government—whether through
Congress or through the DOJ and SEC—that has the power, the ability,
and the responsibility to provide the necessary guidance. So far, the
government has failed in this important task. While the government
attempted to fulfill this responsibility by issuing the FCPA Resource
Guide, Steven Tyrrell, former Chief of the DOJ’s Fraud Section, called
the publication “more of a scrapbook of past DOJ and SEC successes
than a guide book for companies who care about playing by the
rules.”246
Meanwhile, if comparing the costs and benefits of self-reporting
FCPA violations continues to be a “guessing game” for corporate
entities and their counsel,247 some will surely conclude that the overall
costs of voluntary disclosure outweigh the overall benefits. In Ralph
Lauren, the company’s decision to self-report an FCPA violation
resulted in a reduced penalty from the government.248 However, as
practitioners at a leading national law firm state, it is not clear that any
such discount “was sufficient to cover the . . . investigative and other
costs incurred by the company as a result of the self-report, and the
additional burdens the company has agreed to shoulder by entering into
the NPAs.”249 That assessment—that the rewards conferred by the
government for electing to self-report might, in some cases, not be
worth the costs involved—even if targeted to one particular case, is the
sort of conclusion the federal government likely does not want to hear
from FCPA professionals working on the front lines.250
246. Joe Palazzolo, U.S. Attempts to Clarify Antibribery Law, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 14, 2012),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324735104578118850181434228.html.
247. Ensign, supra note 4 (quoting Laurence Urgenson, Partner at Mayer Brown LLP).
248. See supra Part V.
249. The Ralph Lauren Case: Inadequate Rewards for Exemplary Corporate Cooperation,
COVINGTON & BURLING LLP (Apr. 26, 2013), available at http://www.cov.com/
files/Publication/4c57f566-0c8c-4058-a0bd-00f5b2de0185/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/
abc31fce-c793-4611-a7de-0ed94eea3e01/E-Alert%20-%20The%20Ralph%20Lauren%20
Case.pdf.
250. See Richard Craig Smith et al., Takeaways from Diebold’s FCPA Settlements,
LAW360 (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/484980/takeaways-from-diebold-sfcpa-settlements (“Although U.S. authorities may be willing to reward companies for selfdisclosing FCPA issues . . . the positive credit received is not always clear. The ultimate
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In the end, self-reporting is only one of numerous factors influencing
whether and how the government decides to pursue a given FCPA
matter.251 With that knowledge in hand, and with the insights learned
from Ralph Lauren and the other FCPA cases set forth in this Article, a
corporate entity, when faced with the discovery of an FCPA violation,
could reasonably conclude the following: “We choose to keep quiet and
not voluntarily disclose. If by chance the issue comes to light at a later
time, which it may or may not, then it appears the consequences won’t
be much harsher than if we had self-reported the matter ourselves—
especially if we immediately agree to engage in significant and ongoing
cooperation and remediation activities with the government.”252 In
putting forth this possibility, this Article is neither advocating for nor
condoning a corporate entity’s choice to not self-disclose a violation to
the federal government. Rather, this Article simply points out that if the
matter is truly a business decision prompting companies to undertake a
cost–benefit analysis, then ultimately choosing not to self-report would,
in many instances, likely be a reasonable decision based upon the
information currently made available through the disposition of
previous FCPA cases.253
financial and operational burden on a company may, in any given instance, outweigh credit
received.”).
251. As discussed in Part III, supra, the federal government has enormous discretion in
deciding what to do with potential FCPA violators—whether to prosecute at all, what charges to
bring if prosecution moves forward, and how much of a penalty discount to give should there be
a negotiated resolution.
252. See Ensign, supra note 4. Ensign quotes attorney Aaron Murphy, who suggested that
instead of self-reporting an FCPA problem to the government, attorneys can “document
everything very, very well, wrap it up and put a bow on it and put it on the shelf. Then one day
if the government comes asking you can say, ‘Hey, look this is old news, we fixed it when we
found out about it.’” Id.; see also DOJ Officials Encourage Companies to Cooperate Against
Potentially Culpable Individuals, DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP FCPA UPDATE, Sept. 2014, at 2
(reporting that Marshall Miller, DOJ’s Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the
Criminal Division, stated at a Global Investigations Review conference in September 2014 that,
in determining whether to bring charges against a company, the fourth of nine Principles of
Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (or so-called ‘Filip factors’) instructs prosecutors
to consider both “the corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its
willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents.” Miller noted that companies too
often focus on the first prong of the factor and give “short shrift” to the second, which he
describes as “the heart of effective corporate cooperation”).
253. Estimates are that only one-third of FCPA enforcement actions start based on
information that companies self-report to the federal government. See DON ZARIN, DOING
BUSINESS UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT, § 10:2.10 n.15 (2009); see also Editor,
Mitigating FCPA Risk and Issues to Consider in Conducting Investigations, METROPOLITAN
CORP. COUNS., May 2011, at 19 (reporting an interview with Professor Mike Koehler, who
states: “The enforcement agencies will tell you that they give credit for voluntary disclosures.
However, from a strict dollars-and-cents perspective, realize this—if a company receives X
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Moving forward, to increase the likelihood that companies will
consistently choose to self-report FCPA violations, and thereby assist in
eradicating the scourge of transnational bribery worldwide, the DOJ and
SEC must be more forthcoming and transparent. Their policies,
pronouncements, rules, and regulations must provide more certain,
specific, and calculable incentives to companies for volunteering to
come forward. The limited amount of information that the DOJ and
SEC currently provide gives these agencies two enormously powerful
tools in their dealings with alleged wrongdoers: flexibility and
discretion.254 If the agencies do not set forth the benefits and incentive
structures in a completely forthcoming and transparent manner, then
each successive FCPA matter that comes before either agency can be
negotiated on a relatively blank canvas—quite a different negotiation
than would take place if the agencies were more constrained and
directed through explicit, detailed, and specific rules, policies, and
regulations that were relatively certain to be applied in each case, i.e.,
something that looked more like legal precedent.255
Indeed, a top DOJ official acknowledged the frustration existing
within the private sector over the lack of certainty in self-reporting
benefits but then proceeded to point out, according to one report, “that
the DOJ needs to retain flexibility and thus cannot make categorical
pronouncements on the impact of a company’s determination to selfreport.”256 This Article suggests, however, that companies will be more
percent credit because of its self-disclosure, it is likely that the company will have spent X plus
ten percent more on legal fees and related expenses to obtain that X percent credit”).
254. See Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 111th Cong. 4
(2010) (testimony of Michael Volkov, partner at Mayer Brown LLP, before the Senate Judiciary
Committee, Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs); U.S. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME AND DRUGS 4 (Nov. 30, 2010), available at
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/10-11-30%20Volkov%20Testimony.pdf
(testifying that the DOJ has not provided clarity on the matter of voluntary disclosure,
but instead offers “vague promises of benefits and little to no certainty as to results, all to
preserve its discretion to impose a fine and plea as they see fit” (emphasis added)).
255. See Editor, supra note 253 (reporting an interview with Professor Mike Koehler, who,
when asked by the Editor if the DOJ’s corporate leniency policies have been successful in
creating incentives for self-reporting, stated: “To the extent there are any leniency policies, they
are ad hoc and generally not transparent. That is part of the problem. FCPA enforcement suffers
from a lack of transparency like no other area of the law.”).
256. See DOJ’s and SEC’s FCPA Enforcement Priorities, DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP
FCPA UPDATE, Nov. 2011, at 9 (reporting on the 26th National Conference on the FCPA
organized by the American Conference Institute in Nov. 2011: “[Fraud Section Deputy Chief
Charles E.] Duross acknowledged frustration by the private sector about the uncertain value of
voluntary self-reporting but pointed out that the DOJ needs to retain flexibility and thus cannot
make categorical pronouncements on the impact of a company’s determination to self-report”
(emphasis added)).
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likely to self-report in large numbers, and regarding significant FCPA
matters, if and when they can determine with certainty and specificity
that the rewards obtained will outweigh the risks involved. Scott D.
Hammond, the DOJ’s former Deputy Assistant Attorney General for
Criminal Enforcement in the Antitrust Division, bolsters this conclusion
by stating that a “key component” to the success of that division’s
highly successful Corporate Leniency Program is “transparency and
predictability.”257 Commenting on leniency programs more generally,
Hammond states: “If companies cannot confidently predict how an
enforcement authority will apply its leniency program, [they] may
ultimately decide against self-reporting and cooperation . . . .”258
Given that voluntary disclosure appears to be the “engine that fuels”
the government’s FCPA enforcement program,259 and given that there is
“every reason to believe that much more misconduct is unearthed within
the corporate setting than is publicly disclosed,”260 any changes leading
to increased self-reporting of FCPA violations would simultaneously
lead to (1) more company accountability for wrongdoing; (2) less
government spending on costly investigations; and (3) more money
accumulating in the U.S. Treasury through substantial fines. While the
DOJ and SEC might argue that changes to the status quo are
unnecessary, this Article urges the federal government to work toward
bringing about the increases in certainty, predictability, and
transparency discussed herein and contends that achieving those goals
would be highly beneficial to companies, to the American public, and,
most importantly, to the people and institutions throughout the nation
and world currently suffering the ill effects of transnational bribery.

257. See Scott D. Hammond, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Criminal
Enforcement, DOJ, Antitrust Division, Measuring the Value of Second-In Cooperation in
Corporate Plea Negotiations, Address at the 54th Annual ABA Section of Antitrust Law Spring
Meeting (Mar. 29, 2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/215514.pdf.
258. See Scott D. Hammond, Cornerstones of an Effective Leniency Program, U.S. DOJ
Director of Criminal Enforcement Antitrust Division, Presented at the ICN Workshop on
Leniency Programs (Nov. 22–23, 2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/
speeches/206611.pdf (emphasis added).
259. See Michael Volkov, Fixing the Justice Department’s FCPA Voluntary Disclosure
Program, CORRUPTION, CRIME & COMPLIANCE (Oct. 7, 2012, 5:41 PM), available at
http://documents.lexology.com/9a72ec48-fc4a-4234-b91a-720d73f52acc.pdf (stating that “[t]he
FCPA Unit knows that voluntary disclosure has been—and will continue to be—the engine that
fuels its aggressive enforcement program. SEC whistleblowers may identify a case here and
there but in the end, companies which come in to the Justice Department and confess drive the
recoveries and the numbers which have sent shockwaves through the corporate community”).
260. James D. Cox, Private Litigation and the Deterrence of Corporate Misconduct, 60
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 18 (1997).
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